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NEOLIBERALISM, COLONIALISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: 
DECENTERING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY 
James Thuo Gathii* 
GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Brad 
R. Roth. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. xxx, 439. 
$95. 
[In the last few years, a new politics of difference is emerging whose dis­
tinctive features are] to trash the monolithic and homogeneous in the 
name of diversity, multiplicity and heterogeneity; to reject the abstract, 
general and universal in light of the concrete, specific and particular; and 
to historicize, contextualize and pluralize by highlighting the contingent, 
provisional, variable, tentative, shifting and changing.1 
Today, the struggle between competing universalisms (liberal democracy 
v. revolutionary-democratic dictatorship) - more or less resolved, at 
least for the present - seems set to be succeeded by struggle between 
universalism and various particularisms (liberal democracy v. assertions 
of cultural self-determination, ethnic grievance, and exceptional circum­
stances). [p. 365] 
INTRODUCTION 
Brad R. Roth's Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law2 is 
a neoconservative realist response to liberal internationalists (or uni­
versalists ). As a critique, the book unsurprisingly legitimizes the sub­
ject of its attack: liberal internationalism. That is so since in their op­
position to each other, liberal internationalists and neoconservative 
realists fall within the same discursive formation - a Euro-American 
* Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University. S.J.D. 
1999, LL.M. 1995, Harvard; LL.B. 1992, University of Nairobi. - Ed. I would like to thank 
Celestine Nyamu, Samuel Murumba and Nathaniel Berman for their comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. I would also like to acknowledge the encouragement of Wayne Eastman, 
Michael Santoro, Ed Hartman, Antony Anghie, Obiora Okafor, David Kennedy, and 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal. Heidi Hanley's research assistance is appreciated. 
1. Cornel West, The New Cultural Politics of Difference, in THE IDENTITY IN QUESTION 
147 (John Rajchman ed., 1995). 
2. Brad Roth is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science, Wayne State 
University. 
1996 
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hegemony of thinking, writing, critiquing, engaging, producing, and 
practicing international law. 
This Review is an antihegemonic critique. It seeks to decenter this 
Euro-American opposition between liberal internationalism and neo­
conservative realism that has characterized the study of international 
law, especially in the post-Cold War period. This Review aims to 
demonstrate the limitations of the commitments of liberal internation­
alism (to a universal culture of liberal democracy and free markets), 
on the one hand, and of neoconservatism (to maintain the integrity of 
sovereign states that have effective control of their populations by re­
stricting intervention in their internal affairs), on the other hand, as 
the only alternatives to understanding and producing knowledge 
about legitimacy in international law. 
My antihegemonic critique could very well be referred to as consti­
tuting a third-world approach. Third-world because it is neither 
American nor European, and because it is intended as a counterweight 
to the overwhelming dominance of American and European academia 
in the production of knowledge about international law. This third­
world approach thus not only disrupts the hegemonic approaches to 
the study of international law, but also partly embodies the political 
goals of the third world, as I see them. It is thus as legal as it is politi-
cal.3 
· 
This Review is inspired by scholars engaged in Third World Ap­
proaches to International Law (TW AIL) who, in the last fifty or so 
years, have represented a variety of shifting positions within the anti­
hegemonic critique of Euro-American approaches.4 In reclaiming the 
discursive energy of these engagements with international law, third­
world scholarship has harnessed the critical insights from a variety of 
disciplines, including postcolonialism, cultural studies, Marxism, criti-
3. It is worth noting that, in their casebook, Henkin, Pugh, and Schachter declared that 
law is politics! See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
iii (3d ed., 1993) ("The years since the previous edition was published have witnessed radical 
transformations in the international political system, with corresponding change . . .  in inter­
national law and institutions. It seems timely therefore, to make explicit the political character 
and context of international law and to place it up front: Chapter One, page one.") (emphasis 
added). While it is interesting that the foregoing quote implicitly acknowledges that think­
ing of international law as politics was held back during the Cold War, my definition of poli­
tics here is more inclusive. See infra note 5 and accompanying text 
4. Some of these scholars include M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); THOMAS OLAWALE ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972); S.B. Gurro, HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS FOR THE 
OPPRESSED : CRITICAL EsSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS FROM 
A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW PERSPECTIVE (1993); U.0. UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND COLONIALISM IN AFRICA (1979). 
I try to articulate these positions in James Thuo Gathii, Foreword, Alternative and Criti­
cal: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on Developing Countries to International 
Legal Theory, 41 HARV. INT'L LJ. (forthcoming 2000); James Thuo Gathii, International 
Law and Eurocentricity, EUR. J. INT'L L. 184 (1998) (book review). 
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cal race theory, feminist analysis, new approaches to international law, 
and critical legal theory, among others. 
Elements of my antihegemonic critique of the liberal/conservative 
dichotomy are linked together by two central analyses: an economic 
critique and a cultural, nonmaterial critique. I do not subscribe to the 
idea that cultural and nonmaterial forms of oppression underplay the 
real dynamics of oppression in economic structures and relations. I do 
acknowledge, however, the potential for decentering, unpacking, or 
deconstructing homogeneous or universal categories of representa­
tion.5 For example, legitimacy, as embodied in Governmental 
Illegitimacy, occupies a Euro-American discursive framework and 
excludes non-Euro-American notions of legitimacy. By unpacking 
this Euro-American mode of representing legitimacy, I hope to pro­
liferate the meaning of legitimacy to go beyond examining state legit­
imacy into examining legitimacy in a wider context including race, 
culture, class, and sex.6 My project, however, is not simply to provide 
a countervailing or an authentic notion of legitimacy, but rather to 
overcome the "given grounds of opposition" between liberal inter­
nationalism and neoconservative realism by opening up a space to 
5. Here, I adopt Gaytri Spivak's explanation of deconstruction: 
Postcoloniality - the heritage of imperialism in the rest of the globe - is a deconstructive 
case. As follows: Those of us from formerly colonized countries are able to communicate 
with each other and with the metropolis, to exchange and to establish sociality and transna· 
tionality, because we have had access to the culture of imperialism. Shall we then assign to 
that culture ... a measure of "moral luck?" I think there can be no doubt that the answer is 
"no." This impossible "no" to a structure which one critiques, yet inhabits intimately, is the 
deconstructive philosophical position, and the everyday here and now of "postcoloniality" is 
a case of it. Further, the political claims that are most urgent in decolonized space are tacitly 
recognized as coded within the legacy of imperialism: nationhood, constitutionality, citizen­
ship, democracy, socialism, even culturalism. Within the historical frame of exploration, 
colonization, and decolonization, what is being effectively reclaimed is a series of regulative 
political concepts, the supposedly authoritative discourse narrative of whose production was 
written elsewhere, in the social formations of Western Europe. They are thus being re­
claimed, indeed claimed, as concept metaphors for which no historically adequate referent 
may be advanced from postcolonial space. 
GAYTRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, OUTSIDE IN TIIE TEACHING MACHINE 280-82 {1993) .  
Anthony Appiah similarly argues that 
[I]f there is a lesson in the broad shape of ... circulation of cultures, it is surely that we are 
already contaminated by each other, that there is no longer a fully autochthonous eclll­
African culture awaiting salv�ge by our artists (just as there is, of course, no American cul­
ture without African roots). 
KW AME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATIIER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN TIIE PHILOSOPHY OF 
CULTURE 155 {1992). 
6. As Edward Said argues with reference to orientalism: 
[T]his study proposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western poli­
tics and of the non-Western world in those politics as of the strength of Western cultural dis­
course, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or "superstructural." My hope is 
to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly 
colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves 
or upon others. 
EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 25 1978. 
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make possible "the construction of a political project that is new, 
neither one nor the other [and] . . . that can accept the differential 
structure of the moment of intervention without rushing to produce a 
unity of the social antagonism or contradiction. "7 
In proliferating the meaning of legitimacy and the variety of cate­
gories whose legitimacy needs interrogation, I hope to mobilize the 
conceptual potential of critical analysis and theory for "change and in­
novation. "8 I hope to open new arenas of inquiry that are foreclosed 
within the discursive terrain of Euro-American international legal 
scholarship/production. Yet, I am aware that, in seeking to transcend 
the paralyzing antithesis of Euro-American international legal produc­
tion, it is far too easy to foreclose systemic analysis of the foundational 
themes raised by my materialist and structuralist critique of neoliberal 
economics.9 I argue that the two critiques could be deployed simulta­
neously. For example, neoliberal economic restructuring (or free­
market reform under the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions10) 
relies on racial and cultural stereotyping as a central, unstated, but ap­
parent, element of the otherwise neutral-sounding economic justifica-
7. HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 25 (1994). Bhabha argues such a pro-
gressive reading is 
effective because it uses the subversive, messy task of camouflage and does not come like a 
pure avenging angel speaking the truth of a radical historicity and pure oppositionality. If 
one is aware of this heterogeneous emergence (not origin) of radical critique, then .. . the 
function of theory within the political process becomes double edged. It makes us aware 
that our political referents and priorities - the people, the community, class struggle, anti­
racism, gender difference, the assertion of an anti-imperialist, black or third perspective -
are not there in some primordial, naturalist sense. Nor do they reflect a unitary or homoge­
nous political object. They make sense as they come to be constructed in the discourses of 
feminism or Marxism or Third Cinema or whatever, whose objects of priority - class or 
sexuality or "the new ethnicity" - are always in historical and philosophical tension, or 
cross-reference with other objectives. 
Id. at26. 
8. Id. at31. 
9. Bhabha argues, however, that this is not necessarily true, since it is necessary to make 
a "distinction between the institutional history of critical theory and its conceptual power 
and potential for change and innovation." Id. Further, he argues that the conceptual power 
of critical theory for transformation ( what he calls translation) is possible when "the tension 
within critical theory between its institutional containment and its revisionary force" is ac­
knowledged. Id. at 32. 
10. The Bretton Woods institutions are the World Bank, otherwise referred to as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary 
Fund. Both were created after the Second World War, the former to give member countries 
multiyear loans for a variety of development projects, and the latter to lend to member 
countries for shorter periods with a view to facilitating their currency transactions and ena­
bling them to meet short-term deficits in foreign exchange. Policy-based lending, or what 
has been referred to as conditionality, is an important part of the lending functions of these 
institutions. These conditionalities include: national economic integration into the interna­
tional economy through liberalization and deregulation; currency devaluations to spark 
export-oriented growth; and a reduction of government spending, particularly to control 
fiscal deficits, among other reforms. These reforms have been referred to with a variety of 
labels, including the Washington Consensus and Neo-Liberalism. 
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tions in favor of free markets.11 Since deconstructive critiques of uni­
versal categories of representation potentially foreclose critiques of 
economic relations and relations of production, the deconstructive cri­
tique and the foundational critique invariably contradict each other 
but also operate ambivalently throughout this Review.12 
Each section of this Review focuses on a major theme(s) in 
Governmental Illegitimacy. In Part I, I explain how Roth's critique of 
liberal internationalism is a form of neoconservative realism, and I 
outline the main themes and arguments Roth makes. Further, I argue 
that Roth's neoconservative take on legitimacy as a response to liberal 
internationalists reflects the extent to which debates on governmental 
legitimacy in the Euro-American academia are trapped within a 
Eurocentric either/or framework. 
Part II argues that, notwithstanding Roth's proposal that neocon­
servative realism ought to ·prevail over liberal internationalism in de­
bates on legitimacy, there is a lot of common ground shared by these 
liberal and conservative proposals, in terms of their implicit or explicit 
endorsement of American economic hegemony internationally, and in 
terms of their pretensions of universality and their commitment to a 
common set of abstract legal principles. 
Part III argues that Roth's analysis, in general, diminishes coloni­
alism as ephemeral or exceptional, rather than as integral, continuing, 
and present. In essence, the continuities and discontinuities among 
colonialism, the mandate system, and the trusteeship system, as well as 
the era of self-determination, are left unexamined. In Part IV, I ex­
plore the consequences of Roth's maintenance of a public/private dis­
tinction: that politics resides in the public arena of intervention in civil 
society overseas, rather than in the private order. 
Part V challenges Roth's allegiance to Euro-American conceptions 
of the nonintervention norm, a norm which excludes interventions in 
the economic affairs of sovereign states as a possible international le­
gal violation. I also demonstrate the consequences of the Euro­
American hostility to accommodating a countervailing optic that 
would examine the distributional costs of the market's inability to 
spread its goodies around the world efficiently, optimally, or even eq­
uitably. 
11. For elaboration, see James Thuo Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Govern­
ance Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 1998-99 THIRD 
WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65. 
12. Although I was born and bred in Kenya, an African country, I nevertheless ac• 
knowledge that my privileged presence in the academy within the· United States has invaria­
bly influenced my scholarship. It could very well be reflective of the cultural politics of the 
constantly changing global economy. See generally AIAZ AHMAD, IN THEORY: CLASSES, 
NATIONS, LITERATURES (1992); Aijaz Allmad, Jameson's Rhetoric of Otherness and the 
'National Allegory', 17 Soc. TEXT3 (1987); ArifDirlik, The PostcolonialA11ra: Third World 
Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 328 (1994) . 
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In Part VI, I commend how Roth transcends the Liberal, linear 
story that sovereignty - classically understood as a consolidated unit 
that formalizes the boundary between the national and the interna­
tional - is in the process of erosion and reformulation. In Part VII, I 
take issue with Roth's adherence to the state as a juridical entity be­
reft of its cultural, national, and ideological dimensions. I argue that, 
unless the state is thought of in this larger context, it is easy to fail to 
appreciate the legitimacy/illegitimacy of the postcolonial African state. 
Last, in Part VIII, I examine Roth's analysis of the indeterminacy 
and limitations of both liberal advocacy for participatory rights and 
neoconservative advocacy for effective control as barometers of le­
gitimacy. Neither of these approaches to legitimacy can be seen out­
side its alliance with regressive political and economic programs. For 
example, Roth celebrates Haiti as a success story of intervention be­
cause it exemplifies the emerging liberal consensus that participatory 
rights are a barometer of legitimacy. But the celebration of interven­
tion should not obscure its costs. As a consequence of intervention, 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide abandoned a popular economic pro­
gram that would have benefited the large Haitian underclass by redis­
tributing the wealth held by Haiti's military-economic elite. This also 
resulted in the return of poor Haitian refugees to Haiti in violation of 
their rights against non-refoulement with the legal imprimatur of the 
United States Supreme Court and the collaboration between the 
United States and the Haitian elite in the domination and exploitation 
of the Haitian underclass. The Review ends with a conclusion that 
sums up the broad outlines of my argument. 
I. DEFINING ROTH'S NEOCONSERV ATIVE REALIST CRITIQUE 
I characterize Roth as a neoconservative realist for a variety of 
reasons. First, Roth, like early American realists, is not wedded to the 
idea that abstract legal concepts determine the content of subrules and 
outcomes of legal controversy. Roth's analysis can, in fact, be analo­
gized to American international legal thinkers of the postwar period. 
These thinkers rejected positivism and began inquiring into whether 
or not international law was moored in a moral foundation. These 
thinkers also recognized the individual as a subject of international 
law and expressed skepticism about the overdetermination of state 
sovereignty.13 
Although Roth's analysis is realist in that sense, it adds up to being 
an overdeveloped critique of the indeterminacy of legitimacy in the 
public sphere within Western society. Hence, Roth examines the 
place of social reality in both liberalism and revolutionary democratic 
13. For a review of this tradition, see Carl Landauer, J.L. Brierly and the Modernization 
of International Law, 25 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 881, 917 {1993). 
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dictatorship (as opposed to, say, their abstract principles and form), 
but he pays no attention to the pretences of neutrality and therefore of 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the private international rules that 
undergird market activity. This anomaly similarly characterizes public 
international legal scholarship and marks where Roth departs from 
American legal realism and postrealist thought. 
Second, Roth is like a neoconservative since his take on legitimacy 
and illegitimacy of governments is very much a critique of liberalism, 
specifically liberal internationalism, for overextending itself as the 
only and universal source of governmental legitimacy.14 Governmental 
Illegitimacy is perhaps one of the first book-length critiques of liberal 
internationalism in the area of governmental illegitimacy in interna­
tional law. The neoconservative tradition is specific to the United 
States and is embedded in American exports such as neoliberalism15 
and democracy-promotion programs. The neoconservative tradition is 
roughly a nineteenth-century laissez-faire commitment supplemented 
by debates that were especially critical of the New Deal and that char­
acterized social, economic, and political progress as arising automati­
cally from the spread of free markets, unfettered by any public con­
straints. Neoconservatism in the post-Second World War period arose 
as a counterpoint to New Deal liberalism. New Deal liberalism, ac­
cording to the neoconservatives, overextended itself in translating wel­
fare needs into legal entitlements, thereby maintaining, by legal im­
primatur, dependency upon public resources by one section of the 
population without reciprocal obligations. Hence, in giving public 
help to undeserving citizens, the neoconservatives argued that the wel­
fare state stepped outside the bounds of classical liberalism and that it 
was therefore necessary to return to the era when such legally pro­
tected entitlements were shorn back. After all, the neoconservatives 
argued, welfare was neither contractually "earned," as prior contribu­
tions were, nor tied to any previous effort or responsibility; it could 
not be conceptualized as the fruits of a prior fixed arrangement with 
the government.16 
14. I am not suggesting a conspiracy between Roth and neoconservative thinkers in the 
United States. In fact, my claim is not that Roth has any affiliation or relation to these neo­
conservatives, but rather that the common thread that runs between Roth and other neocon­
servatives is their disdain for liberalism overextending itself. In the context of American 
political life, leading neoconservative thinkers include: IRVING KRISTOL, TWO CHEERS FOR 
CAPITALISM (1978); THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH ( Nathan Glazer & Irving Kristo! 
eds., 1976); DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976). 
15. Neoconservatism is embedded in neoliberalism in that both distrust governmental 
regulation of the economy and prefer free markets in the allocation of resources. For a defi­
nition of neoliberalism, see supra note 10. 
16. For an excellent reading of the gendered and racial underpinnings of welfare in the 
United States, see Susan Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a 
Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 3 09 {1994). For an overview of the controversy, 
see ALAN BRINKLEY, LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998) and GARETH DAVIES, 
May 2000] Neoliberalism, Colonialism 2003 
In analogizing Roth to neoconservatives, my point is that his book 
is very much a critique of what he considers to be the over­
determination of liberal internationalism as the barometer of legiti­
macy of governments. In this way, he shares with neoconservatives 
the urge to swing the pendulum away from the liberals towards an al­
ternative view of international society - which, contrary to the liberal 
faith in a laissez-faire world order bringing progress to humanity, is a 
society so plural as to render illusory any such unifying source of hope 
for the disparate societies in the international community. That the 
pendulum shifts between these two alternative images in Western so­
ciety is not surprising.17 
Third, in resorting to a whole range of Anglo-American philoso­
phies to justify his proposition, Roth reproduces a significant short­
coming - the quest for a foundational standpoint of impartial judg­
ment on procedural (the illegitimacy of states) as opposed to 
substantive (e.g., equality) commitments, while simultaneously rele­
gating institutional innovation and substantive concerns and their le­
gitimacy or illegitimacy to a secondary, merely technical or tactical, 
stage of reflection. Hence, unlike neoconservatives who turn towards 
private markets and the private realm -and away from the state - as 
mediating structures of social, economic, and political life Roth em­
braces the state and is silent on the significance, if any, of markets or 
of the private sphere in his conception of governmental (il)legitimacy. 
For Roth, illegitimacy and legitimacy of governments are procedural 
concerns that only implicitly involve normative choices. In fact, Roth 
tries to establish a norm of governmental illegitimacy as a counter­
point to the relativist, policy-based, and substantive democratic enti­
tlement norm and, of course, to the revolutionary democratic dictator­
ship alternative. Roth's norm of governmental illegitimacy is designed 
to avoid this relativism since he postulates it as a procedural norm that 
is perhaps neutral and therefore legally acceptable in a plural interna­
tional society. 
The silence regarding the private sphere places it and the hierar­
chies inherent within it beyond scrutiny in Roth's proposal. In fact, 
the paradox of Roth's position is that, although he remains committed 
to popular will, his examination of only the legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of state authority invariably endorses the inequalities inherent in the 
private order, which overlays the authority of any government pro­
viding its public imprimatur in private ordering. One could then ask, 
why keep the private sphere, within which peoples' most fundamental 
interests (especially in deeply unequal societies) are constituted, shut 
FROM OPPORTUNITY TO ENTITLEMENT: THE TRANSFORMATION AND DECLINE OF GREAT 
SOCIETY LIBERALISM {1996). 
17. See, e.g., David Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 4 
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330, 343 (1994); Landauer, supra note 13, at 908-17. 
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off from the debate on illegitimacy, unless one were endorsing the pri­
vate realm as an arena of individual freedom and choice rather than 
an arena characterized by inequality, coercion, and unfreedom?18 I 
would therefore argue that the reason why Roth remains a neoconser­
vative realist rather than a neoliberal is found in his near-total neglect 
of anything economic in his analysis of legitimacy and illegitimacy.19 
A. Main Themes of Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law 
Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law is well-written, 
well-argued, and well-researched. Its author is the recipient of the 
American Society of International Law's annual certificate of merit 
award for a work in a specialized area, an indication that this book de­
serves more reviewers' attention than it has attracted. In view of the 
importance of the themes that the book tackles and the bold insights 
that Roth makes, this Review argues that, although Governmental 
Illegitimacy does break new ground in post-Cold War international 
legal theory on illegitimacy of governments, it remains wedded to a 
Eurocentric bipolarity that is specifically American in its continuation 
of a neoconservative realist20 response to liberal internationalists.21 In 
18. On this point, see Christopher Pierson, Democracy, Markets and Capital: Are there 
Necessary Economic Limits to Democracy?, 40 POL. STUD. 83 {1992). 
19. Roth, however, briefly notes that it is possible that the revolutionary tradition of 
revolutionary democratic dictatorships itself is 
not so moribund as is now fashionably believed .... [T]he contemporary failure of the revo· 
lutionary project in no way invalidates the insights that prompted so many to embrace it. 
The deficiencies of liberal democracy not only remain, but are being exacerbated as "actu· 
ally existing liberalism" retreats, in much of the world, to a harsh nineteenth-century model of 
negative liberty amid social stratification and economic despair. 
At the moment, the revolutionary orientation has no viable alternative economic model lo 
offer. There is no reason to assume, however, that this will forever be so. Should the revolu· 
tionary phoenix rise from the ashes, old questions will arise anew. 
P. 120 (emphasis added). 
20. Roth refers to his brand of analysis as conservative: 
[I]t would be disingenuous to claim that the instant work (or any work in legal interpreta· 
tion) is a neutral rendering. Wherever possible, it reads the source materials as coherent 
rather than chaotic, and it presents established legal doctrines, especially those emphasizing 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, in a light that suggests that they are not, as 
some have maintained, altogether lacking in moral vision. It is, in a sense, inherently a con· 
servative project. 
P. 34 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Hence, I have coined this term not pejoratively, 
but in reference to Roth's self-described brand of analysis, and in the hope of capturing a 
series of analytical commitments that characterize the book. For example, Roth is neither a 
realist believer in power politics nor a moralist committed to the idea that ideals govern in­
ternational affairs. Pp. 4-5. Instead, Roth observes that, since it is possible to have multiple 
interpretations of international legal norms that are "reasonable," the cynical perception of 
these interpretations is a "problem" that "can be cured only by more rigorous examination 
of international legal principles." P. 8 (emphasis added). Roth states: 
There can thus be no question that recognition of governments - in this specific sense of 
acknowledging their capacity to assert rights, incur obligations, and authorize acts in the 
name of the state - is "eminently a question of international law". Fulfillment of the obli· 
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so doing, the book excludes from its purview non-Western notions of 
governmental legitimacy.22 
There is perhaps no simple way to sum up the thesis of Roth's 
book. But one major theme is that the increasingly popular view 
among liberal scholars in international law - that citizens now have a 
democratic entitlement to vote in elections and therefore to elect a 
government of their choice - is a form of Western cultural and ideo­
logical imperialism. To be sure, although Roth has a healthy dose of 
skepticism in this version of liberal internationalism, cultural imperi­
alism is not what he uses to describe his disagreement with proponents 
of the new democratic entitlement norm. Rather he says that "[t]he 
peace and security order embodied in the United Nations Charter" is 
designed in part to enable states "to order their own affairs unmo­
lested by the predatory designs and ideological or cultural impositions 
of foreign powers."23 This statement embodies the essence of Roth's 
gations of the international system requires according legal recognition to such authority as 
legitimately represents the state to which obligations are owed, and denying legal recogni­
tion to would-be usurpers. This imperative must inform any effort to elaborate the doctrinal 
context within which recent recognition controversies need to be assessed. 
P. 123 (emphasis added). The emphasis on legality in resolving the question of legitimacy's 
exact location seems to be a critical part of Roth's analysis. Overall, Roth's project is one of 
improving international legal theory on the subject of legitimacy, which he finds time and 
again to be rudimentary, inadequate, inchoate, and incomplete. This type of improving or 
attempting to give respectability to legal analysis has been referred to as a rationalizing legal 
analysis. See ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 34 (1996). 
21. My argument here is basically that Roth's analysis of legitimacy is based upon com-
peting sources of legitimacy, all posed in polarities. Roth believes that: 
[to] understand what counts for the international community as a plausible innovation of 
popular will, one must be acquainted with the breadth of the range of legitimacy rationales 
that have maintained a substantial following in contemporary times. To put it glibly, the in­
ternational community contains liberal democrats, non-liberal democrats, liberal non­
democrats, and non-liberal non-democrats, all whom profess fidelity to the abstract principle 
of popular sovereignty. 
Pp. 39-40 (emphasis added). Hence, Roth contrasts, for example, the liberal democratic en­
titlement school with an alternative approach to the location of legitimacy - the revolution­
ary democratic dictatorship. These alternatives posed by Roth are Western or Eurocentric 
approaches to thinking about legitimacy and they exemplify a "pathological" feature of 
Western knowledge systems - binary thinking. This arises in part from a system of knowl­
edge management that is biased towards 
particularly scientific management ... [and is] characterized by its insistence of logical de­
duction from self evident axioms as the only basis of knowledge ... its emphasis on analysis, 
its claim that knowledge must be articulate in order to ... [demonstrate] its pretence to uni­
versality, its celebral nature, its orientation to theory and empirical verification of theory and 
its odd mixture of egalitarianism within the knowledge community and hierarchical superi­
ority versus outsiders. 
FREDERIQUE MARGLIN & STEPHEN MARGLIN, DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE 204 (1990). 
22. For a recent example of an effort to assert a non-Western theory of governmental 
legitimacy, see Edward Kofi Quashigah, Legitimate Governance: The Pre-Colonial African 
Perspective, in LEGffiMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 43 (Edward Kofi Quashigah & Obiora Chinedu Okafor eds., 1999). 
23. Pp. 1-2. Roth argues, for example, that determining the "genuineness" of elections 
in terms of the will of the people is "arguably, inextricable from cultural, social and ideologi-
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project. Instead of tracing the emergence of a new norm of demo­
cratic entitlement through reinterpretation of the sovereignty norm, 
Roth seeks to predicate the increased importance on the will of the 
people or popular sovereignty on the doctrine of "legal recognition" 
of governments, and not on international guarantees of participation 
as liberal internationalists have done. This doctrine is closely related 
to the irrebuttable presumption in international law that a government 
is legitimate when it has effective control. Effective control in this 
context represents the will of the underlying political community ex­
cept in cases of alien, racist, or colonial regimes that are illegitimate ab 
initio.24 
In his own words, Roth seeks to determine: 
(1) the extent to which a norm of popular sovereignty has displaced the 
protections that international law has traditionally accorded de facto 
authorities; (2) the extent of that norm's relationship (if any) to Iiberal­
democratic principles of government; and (3) the legal implications of 
this development for forcible and non-forcible multilateral interventions 
in the internal affairs of states. [p. 1] 
He concludes that the collective practice of states in the post-Second 
World War period suggests that, in the democratic entitlement school, 
there is an "increased significance of empirical manifestations of 
popular will in ad hoc evaluations of governmental legitimacy, but de­
nies that this development entails the emergence of a liberal­
democratic 'legitimism' " (p. 4). 
In my view, although the book adds an interesting spin to the le­
gitimacy debate in its construction of the will of the people through 
the effectiveness of a government's control, there is a way in which it 
also leaves international law in the undesirable Cold War stalemate 
reached between liberals and conservatives. Governmental 
Illegitimacy is a neoconservative realist take on legitimacy of govern­
ments, because it criticizes the liberal internationalist location of 
governmental legitimacy in the realm of international legal guarantees 
of individual participation in their governments. 25 It argues in favor of 
a norm of governmental illegitimacy that arises not from the idealistic 
cal matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction, the result being (however 
regrettably) that the regime itself is privileged to act as the authoritative interpreter of local 
norms, and thus of its own international obligations." P. 164. 
24. See infra Part III for a more extended discussion of Roth's views of colonial, racist, 
or alien regimes. 
25. Roth notes, for example, that Article 21(3) of the U.N. Charter, "[i]nterpreted 
through the lens of liberal-democratic political thought . . .  puts human rights on a collision 
course with non-intervention norms, positing a human rights norm as the sole legitimate ba­
sis of sovereignty itself." P. 164. In Roth's view, liberal democrats committed to arguing 
that the will of the people is the basis of government authority understate or ignore Article 2 
(7) of the U.N. Charter, which enshrines the nonintervention norm. 
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premises of the International Bill of Rights,26 but from the practice or 
customs of states as may, for example, be evidenced in whether they 
have effective control of their territory (p. 189). In Roth's view, the 
"international system regards ruling apparatuses as self-sufficient 
sources of authority - or rather deems their authority to derive from 
their characteristic ability to secure the acquiescence of their pop­
ulaces, by whatever means" (pp. 162-63; emphasis added). The will of 
the people can then be construed from whether the people's govern­
ment has effective control over its territory; where the government has 
effective control, the people have acquiesced to such a government as 
a legitimate authority over them, except where the regime exercising 
such authority is colonial, racist, or alien.27 For Roth, de facto control 
is not a mechanistic description of facts on the ground, but rather re­
quires a "complex" interpretive framework to reveal the underlying 
moral logic of sovereign equality. De facto control and sovereign eq­
uality of states are not the cold, amoral concepts that the liberals have 
represented, but rather signifiers of the increased significance of pop­
ular will in evaluations of governmental legitimacy.28 
26. The International Bill of Rights consists of three important documents: the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at (1948); 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. GAPR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The last two documents came into 
force in 1976. 
27. Roth argues that it is striking that, in drafting Article 25 of the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (unlike Article 21(3) of the U.N. Charter), the draft­
ers "avoided the collision with non-intervention norms by omitting any statement as to the 
basis for the authority of government." P. 164. In Roth's view, therefore, "the basis of 
authority may be such popular will as is expressed by habits of obedience to the regime in ef­
fective control, a will that is further expressed in such elections as the effective regime sees fit to 
hold." P. 164 (emphasis added). Further, in asserting the significance of a government in 
actual control, Roth argues that "non-intervention rules remain at the disposal of the gov­
ernment in effective control to assert in the name of the state." P. 165. He also concludes 
that 
non-intervention norms clearly and consciously discriminate in favor of the established gov­
ernment. The same foreign military assistance that constitutes an unlawful use of force 
when extended to anti-government factions is generally lawful when extended to govern­
ment forces. It is even more clearly true that non-forcible foreign participation in internal 
affairs, however problematic when in aid of groups seeking to undermine or overthrow the 
established government, is unproblematic when in aid of the government . . .. 
[I]nternational law ordinarily has recognized the apparatus in effective control to be the 
government for such purposes. 
P. 171 (footnote omitted). 
28. Pp. 2-4. Roth later argues that: 
The ordinary lack of international attention to the basis of governmental authority is fre­
quently attributed to crass pragmatism rather than principle. What this attribution fails to 
comprehend, however, is that applicable principles, to the extent that they embody positive 
international law and not mere abstract moralizing, are, of necessity, eminently pragmatic. 
Moreover, sovereign equality, the cornerstone of overlapping consensus in the international 
community, is itself a morally grounded principle. The equality of political communities en­
tails, in the ordinary case, accepting on equal terms such stable internal arrangements as pre-
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This indeterminacy (between international legal entitlements and 
interpretations of de facto control and sovereign equality of states) of 
the source of legitimacy for governments is therefore a major linchpin 
upon which Roth predicates his critique of liberal internationalists.29 
It is also the very reason that I argue that the book takes us back to a 
stalemate already reached between conservatives and liberals during 
the Cold War. A second source of frustration with the book arises in 
part from the fact that this neoconservative realist position repeats the 
mistake made by its subject of attack, liberal internationalism. By 
predicating a norm of governmental illegitimacy on actual praxis 
rather than on international legal guarantees, as the acid test for le­
gitimacy in a plural international society, neoconservative realists 
overlook the fact that even the determination of seemingly factual 
evidence, such as whether a government has effective control over its 
territory, could be as subjective and as manipulable as the determina­
tion of whether an election was free and fair under the International 
Bill of Rights. This problem arises in part because Roth's proposal of 
de facto control as a source of legitimacy or illegitimacy of states is not 
integrated throughout his analysis with his misgiving that de facto con­
trol does not always square with political will, an issue he takes up 
mainly in his discussion of recognition contests in Chapter Seven (pp. 
2, 183, 197, 253). 
Seen another way, Roth's neoconservative realism could be said to 
reflect his defense of the Westphalian state system complete with its 
attendant doctrines of statehood as a natural and necessary view of the 
world, while the liberal internationalists hold this view in contempt for 
being a defense of what they consider an old and decaying order. For 
the liberal internationalist, the state system has now been superceded 
by a multitude of interlocking jurisdictions, the market economy and a 
variety of regional and international actors all underpinned less by 
their commitment to their respective states and increasingly on a uni­
versal commitment to free markets and the values of liberal democ­
racy. They argue that the traditional functions of the state have been 
greatly undermined as state boundaries have become more porous to 
flows of capital, goods, and technology.30 
sent themselves. It further quite arguably entails, as a matter of respect for persons whose 
circumstances and ways of thinking are imperfectly understood by outsiders, acknowledging 
at face value the decision of a people to acquiesce in those arrangements. 
P.345. 
29. For a discussion of this indeterminacy in the context of colonial, racist, or alien re· 
gimes, see pp. 201-51. 
30. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International 
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. lNT'L L. 205 {1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et 
al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisci· 
plinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. lNT'L L. 367 {1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law 
in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal 
International Relations Law Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. 
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For Roth, the state and its (il)legitimacy remain a central focus. 
While liberal internationalists look to the International Bill of Rights, 
among other sources, to justify a democratic entitlement for citizens as 
the basis of state legitimacy or illegitimacy, Roth construes legitimacy 
and illegitimacy from the state in the first place. In his view, legitimate 
force can only be imposed by a legitimate state apparatus. In exercis­
ing such legitimate force, such an apparatus must be "acting on what I 
acknowledge to be their duty or license under a duly constituted sys­
tem of governance to which I am concededly subject (even if I am 
justly in opposition to any number of its policies)" (p. 17). The state 
and its apparatus of power are for Roth the starting point in appreci­
ating legitimacy and illegitimacy. From this understanding, legitimacy 
can be construed as the acquiescence of citizens to a necessary institu­
tion or evil in society - the state. This is not a benign idea of the 
state, nor is it a benevolent one. 
For example, Roth's brief discussion of usurper governments fol­
lowing coups d'etat is confined to the legal significance of their acts 
and "the obligations of citizens with respect to those acts as might be 
seen retroactively following the restoration of the legitimate govern­
ment" (p. 156). This discussion telescopes complex and elaborate 
questions surrounding the legitimacy of regimes that result from suc­
cessful coups and revolutions both in the international and domestic 
constitutional and legal contexts.31 Telescoping the significant moral 
and political issues raised by such "revolutionary" circumstances into 
legal questions (contained in doctrines such as state necessity and im­
plied mandate) is only one example of the manner in which the ambi­
tion of the subject matter of the book and its reach stand at a disjunc­
ture. Moral and political controversy are so central to discussions on 
legitimacy that they cannot be ignored even by international lawyers.32 
It is interesting that Roth does not discuss the public policy alternative 
to state necessity and implied mandate as one of the innovations 
crafted by courts in responding to a constitutional crisis such as a coup 
d'etat.33 Does the exclusion of this strategy of responding to constitu-
& POL'Y 717 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., 
Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183; Anne-Marie Burley, Toward An Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARV. 
INT'L LJ. 393 (1992). For a critique of Slaughter's liberal international law, see, for exam­
ple, Outi Korhonen, Liberalism and International Law: A Centre Projecting a Periphery, 65 
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 481 (1996). For other critiques of liberal renewal narratives, see gener­
ally Martii Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 455 
(1966); Susan Marks, The End of History?: Reflections on Some International Legal Thesis, 
18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 449, 467-75 (1997). 
31. There is perhaps no better comprehensive and authoritative assessment of these is­
sues than Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coups d'Etat and Com­
mon Law, 27 CORNELLINT'LLJ. 49 (1994). 
32 See, for example, id. at 53-58 for a poignant discussion on this point. 
33. For a discussion of the public policy alternative to state necessity and implied man­
date, see id. at 53, 62. 
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tional crisis disclose a bias in favor of innovations that are legalistic 
rather than open-ended policy considerations of controversial moral 
and political issues? 
Roth's analysis in Governmental Illegitimacy therefore reveals a 
strong neoconservative realism which, by combining philosophical, 
doctrinal, and policy analysis, asserts the importance of state power 
over other political and moral commitments in his conception of le­
gitimacy and illegitimacy of states. Indeed, Roth focuses on the state 
"in the sense of the apparatus that rules in the name of a given politi­
cal community, otherwise known as a 'government' " (p. 22). Roth's 
focus on when political authority is legitimate tells where his analysis 
of legitimacy begins - with the governmental power rather than with 
individual freedom as in the case of liberal internationalists. 
This Review also attempts to move beyond the neoconservative 
realist response to liberal internationalism in at least two major ways: 
first, by demonstrating how the history of colonialism in international 
law has been central in constructing regimes of governmental illegiti­
macy and legitimacy in ways ignored in the Western lib­
eral/conservative realist debates; and second, by demonstrating how 
the post-Cold War debate on the legitimacy of governments is closely 
related to neoliberal economic restructuring, an alliance (between the 
politics and economics of Western domination of developing coun­
tries) also ignored in the debate between the Western liberals and 
conservative realists writing on international law. I interpret the ab­
sence of engagement with the history of colonialism and neoliberalism 
in debates on governmental legitimacy and illegitimacy as a reflection 
of an ideological predilection for the rich industrial democracies across 
the Atlantic. 
In reviewing the book, I therefore examine the understatement of 
several themes that touch on illegitimacy of governments in interna­
tional law in contesting the privileging of Roth's preoccupation with 
determining the legal content of his proposed norm. I challenge 
Roth's commitment to norm creation, suggesting it is oblivious to its 
alliance with a very undemocratic program of global economic gov­
ernance - neoliberalism and a history of colonialism. Undoubtedly, 
however, my reading of Roth is not any less circumstantial and contin­
gent than his reading of international law. 
B. Eurocentric Moorings: Taking Legitimacy Beyond Liberalism 
and Conservatism 
Since the end of the Cold War, an industry in international legal 
circles has developed around justifying more interventionism in inter­
national affairs to protect human rights, avert or attend to interna­
tional humanitarian emergencies, install democracies, monitor elec­
tions, and oversee transitions from authoritarian one-party states and 
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military regimes, among a variety of similar do-gooder programs and 
projects. Governmental Illegitimacy is one of the first scathing book­
length critiques of this liberal enterprise. I am not sure whether the 
publication of the book will spur another flourishing industry in inter­
national legal academia, signaling the demise of the liberal triumpha­
lism of the post-Cold War period. It is too early to tell. Yet, the point 
must be made that the book has come much too long after the ascen­
dancy of liberal triumphalism34 - an indication that a competing in­
dustry providing devastating critiques is yet to emerge. However, with 
the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,35 the qualified ac­
cession of the International Criminal Court36 and the circus surround­
ing congressional delay and reluctance to pay U.N. dues,37 we may be 
seeing a coalescence of neoconservatism that will flow into interna­
tional legal academia in the United States. This possibility is not with­
out merit. After all, my argument is that liberals and conservatives 
have had alternating periods of activist and passivist internationalist 
projects and goals. Governmental Illegitimacy represents an attempt 
to tilt the balance in favor of a neoconservative tradition and away 
from the liberals who have been on the ascendant since the end of the 
Cold War. 
34. Liberal triumphalism is associated with the claim that, after the end of the Cold War, 
liberal democracy prevailed as the final form of human government, just as free markets 
have become ascendant as the most effective mechanism of achieving human progress. See, 
e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992); FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, "A Reply to My Critics," (1989/1990) THE NATIONAL INTEREST at 25. 
35. General Assembly Resolution 50/245 of September 10, 1996. The Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. Drafted at the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva, the Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly on September 10, 1996. It was 
opened for signature on September 24, 1996 at United Nations Headquarters. As of March 
8, 2000, 155 States had signed the CTBT, and instruments of ratification had been deposited 
by 54 States. 
36. The purpose of the Court will be to serve as a permanent international criminal 
court to try persons charged with genocide or other crimes of similar gravity. The Court's 
constitutive document is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9*) [as corrected by the proces-verbaux of 10 November 1998 and 12 July 
1999]. For a discussion of the history of the establishment of the Court and the nature of 
U.S. Objections, see the collection of articles on Developments in International Criminal 
Law in 93 AM. J. INT'LL., 1-123 (1999). 
37. Until quite late into 1999, the United States withheld its dues to the United Nations 
primarily because Congress insisted that reform within one section of the U.N. was an im­
portant prerequisite for these dues to be released. On January 20, 2000, the Chairman of the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations addressed the United Nations Security Coun­
cil and outlined the nature of his objections to releasing U.S. dues to the U.N., including re­
sentment of the U.S. within the U.N., the excessive contributions of the U.S. to the U.N. 
relative to other members, and Jack of reform within the U.N. In fact, Senator Jesse Helms 
indicated that further releases of these outstanding amounts would only be made subject to 
the U.N.'s undertaking reforms that it had committed itself to in an agreement with the U.S. 
See Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Address 
Before the United Nations Security Council (Jan. 20, 2000), available at: <http://www. 
senate.gov/-helms/FedGov/UNSpeech/unspeech.html>. 
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The alternating liberal and neoconservative moments of American 
foreign policy are reflected within theoretical and methodological 
preferences in the traditions of American legal realism, critical legal 
studies, and, of course, poststructuralism, among others.38 Simply 
stated, the liberals are cast as naive believers in the potential efficacy 
that law has for completing the promises of modernity in international 
law: peace, development, and respect for human rights. By contrast, 
the neoconservatives argue that the hopes of modernity will be com­
promised by the power politics and interests of states around the 
world. 
Here I argue that debates on governmental illegitimacy are there­
fore trapped within this either/or framework - for example, that le­
gitimacy can only be sourced in either a liberal or conservative tradi­
tion. This dichotomization is based on a Eurocentric genealogy: the 
opposition between individualism and community; fact and value; rea­
son and desire; form and substance.39 Eurocentric genealogies in in-
38. For an attempt to canonize various approaches to the study of international law in 
the United States, see Steven S. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Symposium on Method In 
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291 (1999). 
39. According to Roberto Unger: 
Wherever liberal psychology prevails, the distinction between describing things in the world 
and evaluating them will be accepted as the premise of all clear thought. Because classical 
metaphysics disregards that distinction, we can no longer speak its language. Yet, there is at 
least one familiar way of thinking to which the distinction cannot be applied, the beliefs of 
religion. Indeed, the view that the understanding of what we ought to is part of a compre­
hension of what the world is really like is a well-recognized characteristic of religious ideas. 
Between liberal psychology and religion, there can be no lasting peace, but at most an illu­
sion of mutual tolerance. From the standpoint of the liberal psychologist, religion must be 
treated as a creature of desire, just as magic can be described as a forerunner of reason. 
ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLmCS 41 (1976) (citation omitted). This telling 
distinction between modernity and premodernity, with reason as a baseline, is a well-known 
lineage of Western thought that has also been traced within international law. See David 
Kennedy, Images of Religion in International Legal Theory, in THE INFLUENCE OF RE­
LIGION ON TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mark Janis ed., 1991); David 
Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1986). This tradition of 
Western thought, however, claimed superiority over non-Western forms of knowledge as a 
source of knowledge. Western forms of knowledge, especially at the height of reason during 
the Enlightenment, discredited non-Western knowledge, culture, and way of life as inferior 
and claimed universality to Western forms of knowledge. Not infrequently, notions of racial, 
religious, political, and economic difference were mobilized to give credence to colonial 
subjugation of non-Western peoples. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: 
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 3 
(1999) [hereinafter Anghie, Finding the Peripheries); Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria 
and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996); Antony 
Anghie, "The Heart of My Home": Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the Nauru 
Case, 34 HARV. INT'L LJ. 445 (1993); Antony Anghie, Universality and the Concept of Gov­
ernance, in LEGmMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 22, at 21; Antony Anghie, Creating the Nation State: Co­
lonialism and Making of International Law (1995) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard 
University) (on file with the Harvard University Library) [hereinafter Anghie, Creating the 
Nation-State J. 
For another fascinating legal account of such claims to dominance of Western forms of 
knowledge, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
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ternational law juxtapose notions of individualism in liberalism with 
notions of communitarianism in Rousseauian or Marxian terms. Un­
surprisingly, Roth unearths genealogies of Rousseau and Marx in 
European discourses of legitimacy to upend what he considers to be 
the overdetermined location of legitimacy within liberalism, especially 
in the post-Cold War period. 
My complaint with this basic project is that it provides only two 
possible and polar alternatives to governmental legitimacy: liberalism 
and conservatism. This limited range of options excludes non­
Western conceptions of legitimacy. Its effect, therefore, is to deny dif­
ference or multiple and heterogeneous possibilities of the meaning 
and scope of legitimacy since it only presents alternatives that are 
diametrically opposed to each other and that are all trapped within 
liberal psychology. For example, "[l]iberal individualism denies dif­
ference by positing the self as a solid, self sufficient unity, not defined 
by or in need of anything or anyone other than itself . . . .  Community, 
on the other hand, denies difference by positing fusion rather than 
separation as the social ideal."40 
Consequently, the debate of legitimacy in international law has 
been about states rather than nongovernmental entities or even inter­
national institutions such as the United Nations or the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Notwithstanding their hegemonic presence in determin­
ing what constitutes development across the third world, the legiti­
macy of the Bretton Woods institutions remains outside the purview 
of the legitimacy debate in international law. I argue that a different 
epistemological point of knowing than that presented by the impasse 
between liberalism and conservatism in Eurocentric thought, from 
which alternative conceptions of legitimacy may be imagined, is neces­
sary to interrogate the legitimacy of international legal processes and 
institutions, as well as to give voice to different and non-European 
voices and conceptions of legitimacy, democracy, and empowerment. 
That would also decenter the current Eurocentric conception of le­
gitimacy.41 
THOUGHT (1990). In a sequel, Robert Williams gives an account of the legal conceptions 
that American Indians utilized in their relations with the West, rather than the legal ideas 
that the West used in justifying their colonial subjugation of American Indian people. See 
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY 
VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997). 
40. Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in 
FEMINISMIPOSTMODERNISM 300, 307 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). 
41. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global 
Community and the Incommensurability of Difference, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996). 
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II. CONTINUITY NOT DISCONTINUITY BETWEEN LIBERAL AND 
CONSERVATIVE 0SCILLATIONISM 
In the United States, various orientations of conservative thought 
have from time to time justified: nonrecognition of international trea­
ties by the United States; the dominant place of American strategic 
and economic interests as superceding any others in international af­
fairs; and the secondary place of morality in international politics. It 
does seem in a rough fashion that, during democratic administrations, 
the liberals are on the ascendancy while, during republican administra­
tions, conservativism or Kissingerian realism kicks in.42 
For example, Woodrow Wilson, the famed icon of American in­
ternationalism, died frustrated in the face of a rising tide of nativism 
and isolationism in a United States unconvinced it needed to play an 
actiye part in international affairs.43 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act44 of 
1930 was perhaps a high point of American isolationism in interna­
tional affairs, as was the period of American self-doubt after the 
Vietnam War debacle.45 It was not until President Ronald Reagan, 
when the United States reinstated what he called the struggle against 
the "evil empire," that American isolationism was interrupted. 
This oscillation between liberalism and conservatism has its own 
problems. First, there is a continuity rather than a discontinuity in 
American economic hegemony worldwide, especially since the 1940s, 
so that, even in periods of isolationism, the economic goals of the 
United States remained at the forefront of American foreign policy. 
One then sees a continuity between liberal and conservative periods of 
international politics insofar as economic and strategic goals continue 
to predominate in both periods. Hence, international legal scholars in 
the U.S. supported Cold War goals of nuclear testing, armed interven­
tion in the name of democracy (even where it contravened United 
Nations commitments against defenseless republics), loss of human 
life in the defense of U.S. strategic interests abroad, and proliferation 
of free markets notwithstanding their distributional impacts across the 
42 See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 
LEIDEN J. lNT'LL. 9, 17-29 (1999). 
43. See RUHL J. BARTLEIT, THE RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 454-57 (4th ed. 
1964); DAVID STEIGERWALD, WILSONIAN IDEALISM IN AMERICA (1994). 
44. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill of 1930 provoked the United States' major trading 
partners into imposing retaliatory tariffs. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE 
AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). 
45. For example, the Congress elected in 1974 denied South Vietnam the assistance it 
needed to ward off the co=unist invasion from North Vietnam. Once the United States 
pulled out of Vietnam, it was unwilling to plunge itself back into the conflict and reopen the 
bitter divisions that foreign involvement had wrought within the United States. 
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world.46 Yet, notwithstanding this overwhelmingly conservative creed, 
there has remained a faithful liberal following, such as the World 
Order Model Project,47 committed to the goals of the United Nations. 
There have also been the activist groups and personalities that have 
thought that implementing the promises of the International Bill of 
Rights is long overdue. And then there are the critical legal scholars 
and the postmodernists who have remained skeptical of the ability of 
international law to fulfill its liberal commitments.48 
Second, continuity presents itself in the legitimacy debate through 
its universalist pretensions. During the Cold War, the ideological 
choices between liberalism and communism were pursued as West­
East alternatives for achieving global dominance and hegemony. Lib­
eralism espouses the individualism that goes with capitalism, while the 
Eastern Bloc, led by the former Soviet Union, preached communism 
and the communitarianism of Rousseau and Marx. For non-Western 
societies, this presents a false choice - an antithesis so fundamentally 
Western in its teleology and so apparent during the Cold War. Roth 
argues that the ascendancy of liberalism does not rule out the reemer­
gence of past revolutionary democratic orders (p. 119), perhaps illus­
trating that he remains embedded within this Eurocentric framework 
that conceives of liberalism and revolutionary democratic dictatorship 
as the only alternatives. My point here is that, notwithstanding their 
46. See generally RICHARD J. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION: THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD (1968); NOAM CHOMSKY & EDWARD S. HERMAN, 
THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM (1979); 3 AKIRA IRIYE, The 
Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, in CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 35 (1993); WALTER LAFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED 
STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA (2d ed. 1993); GADDIS SMITH, THE LAST YEARS OF THE 
MONROE DOCTRINE, 1945-1993 (1994). 
47. The World Order Models Project, WOMP, is a nonprofit research organization. 
One of its latest reports from a multiyear project called the Global Civilization Initiative re­
sulted in a book by Richard Falk. See RICHARD FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE: 
TOWARDS A NEW GLOBALPOLmCS (1995). 
48. According to David Kennedy, international legal doctrine is indeterminate because 
of its circular reasoning and vagueness. In fact, Kennedy has equated mainstream ap­
proaches to law with both critical legal studies and postmodernism. According to Kennedy: 
If we read post-modem legal scholarship as a rotation within the legal academy - as a de­
parture, but also as a continuation of the problematic of contemporary legal scholarship, we 
might give the post-modem credit for a certain irony about its neo-classical imitation - to 
be mocking the impossibility of both the analysis and the political invocation which it asserts. 
After all, calling for "face to face politics" or for liberation of th€l "voice of women" in the 
full-dress regalia of a law review article, festooned with citations and the tone of edited clar­
ity, has got to suggest its own impossibility. 
David Kennedy, A Rotation in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, in CRITICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN GERMAN DEBATE 353, 395 (Christian Joerges & David M. 
Trubek eds., 1989). Martti Koskenniemi argues that "deconstruction" "is only a cultural or 
historical convention, a style with an emancipatory potential but which - just like Kantian 
universalism - is always in danger of being transformed into a means of status quo legitima­
tion." Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 351, 
360 (1999). 
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critique of liberalism, revolutionary democratic dictatorships of the 
East were, like liberalism, also predicated upon a universalizing 
model. This is because, within revolutionary democratic dictatorships, 
the proletariat of the Soviet Union and the West would liberate those 
of the rest of the world.49 This savior attitude towards the non-West is 
evident in a variety of Western discourses on the non-West.50 
Third, there is no fundamental difference between liberalism and 
the conservatism within which I locate Roth. They share so much in 
terms of the abstract principles between them - "rights, majority rule, 
the rule of law, Judea-Christian morality" - that distinguishing one 
from the other becomes difficult.51 Yet, it is not uncharacteristic for 
"legal arguments . . .  [to] directly or analogically translate general po­
litical into legal discourse. The rhetoric of self-reliance is conserva­
tive; that of sharing, liberal. The rhetoric of self-realization is liberal; 
that of communal authority, conservative."52 However, it is not so 
much the porous nature of these alternative ideological and discursive 
frames that this Review finds compelling, but rather the broad institu­
tional, social-structural, and historical context within which shifts be­
tween them occur. In other words, I am as concerned with context 
and history as I am with the normative reflection that is so welcome in 
Roth's analysis. 
Ill. INTERNATIONAL LAW, COLONIALISM, AND LEGITIMACY 
In seeking to establish a legal norm of governmental illegitimacy, 
there is a sense in which Roth can be regarded as overstating interna­
tional law as a "set of rules with origins and applications," and under­
stating it as a "history of a people with institutional, polemic and po­
litical projects."53 It is perhaps this statement of international law 
more as rules and less as a living project that leads Roth to understate 
the susceptibility of international law's deployment in contexts such as 
colonialism and economic restructuring. 
49. P. 102. Roth quotes Marx and Engels at length here: 
The communists • . .  are on the one had, practically, the most advanced and resolute section 
of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; 
on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advan­
tage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions and the ultimate general re­
sults of the proletarian movement. 
P. 102 (quoting Karl Marz & Freidrich Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, in 
THEMARx-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978)). 
50. Makau Wa Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: the Metaphor of Human Rights, 
Paper presented at the Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop Series (Mar. 19, 1999). 
51. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 51 (1997). 
52 Id. at 54. 
53. David Kennedy, 91 AM. J. lNT'L L. 748 (1997) (reviewing SHARON KORMAN, THE 
RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISmON OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND PRACTICE (1996)). 
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In addition to thinking of international law as law, it could also be 
seen as the site for the deployment of institutional, polemic, and po­
litical projects, whether realist, moral, or otherwise. Perhaps nowhere 
is Roth's commitment to the idea of international law as a set of legal 
rules or principles more evident than in his proposal that the "radically 
different interpretations in different parts of the world" of interna­
tionally accepted norms, principles, or rules is a problem that "can be 
cured only by a more rigorous examination of international legal prin­
ciples" (p. 8; emphasis added). This commitment to legality to resolve 
differing interpretations of the law is a form of legal totalitarianism. 
One way of articulating my problem with this commitment to legal 
principles to resolve different interpretations is as follows: advocating 
a theory or norm of governmental illegitimacy or of democratic enti­
tlement may turn out to be more important to how that theory or 
norm turns out than any hard and fast notion of such a theory or 
norm. 
For example, in addition to examining sources of governmental le­
gitimacy other than those claimed by liberals, as Roth brilliantly does, 
a plausible argument may also be made that the liberal triumphalism 
that has characterized American foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
period marks a shift from coercive to consensual American global 
domination. This new era of consensual American domination 
through liberal democracy, exported through democracy-promotion 
programs, may be interpreted as a new stage in American global 
domination.s4 · During the Cold War, the United States retained its 
dominance internationally through a coercive foreign policy that en­
dorsed militaristic and discreet interventionism. In the post-Cold War 
period, democracy promotion, however, represents the continuity of 
the maintenance of United States dominance through consensual 
mechanisms that involve an alliance with third-world elites who gain 
legitimacy by having to go through the hoops of competitive elections 
with widespread citizen participation.ss This new model of democracy 
promotion also represents the ideological victory of free-market capi­
talism as a replacement for alternative visions of social and political 
life, such as socialism. 
In my view, colonialism, like liberal democracy and free markets, is 
in one way or another embodied in the institutional, polemic, and po­
litical projects of which the various rules of international law are part. 
Here, I differ from Roth, who sees colonialism as an exceptional case 
of illegitimacy. Instead of understanding colonialism as extinct or 
even exceptional, I argue that debates on legitimacy cannot be seen 
54. See John-Jean Barya, The New Political Conditionalities of Aid: An Independent 
View From Africa, 24 INST. DEV. STUD. 16 (1993). 
55. See WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, us 
INTERVENTION AND HEGEMONY (1996). 
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outside the dynamics of identity, power, wealth, and inequality at the 
international level. Colonialism has signified and continues to signify 
the manner in which ideologies based on racial and cultural differ­
ences legitimated expropriation, conquest, conversion, and outcomes 
such as slavery. 
Governmental Illegitimacy does not fall into nineteenth-century ra­
cism and in fact criticizes liberal internationalists for embracing a view 
of democracy that is liberal and Western in its outlook in a pluralistic 
society of nations. Yet, this celebration of pluralism could be broader. 
First, it could be mobilized to delegitimize the uncritical liberal ambi­
tion that is shared even in non-Western societies, to the effect of es­
tablishing that people are necessarily the repositories of governmental 
power without a concurrent examination of the quality of governance. 
Second, and more importantly for this part of the Review, Roth's 
analysis could have argued that pretensions of universality in the 
norms of international law have historically been promoted by colo­
nizing and dominant countries. This universalism presupposes that 
there are primitive societies that fall below the so-called great civiliza­
tions of the West. International law has deployed cultural and racial 
stereotypes in delegitimating societies outside the West because they 
fell below conceptions of the state whose standards are naturally and 
necessarily assumed to be those of the so-called great Western civiliza­
tions. In other words, Roth's acknowledgement of pluralism in inter­
national society does not extend to acknowledging that non-Western 
societies can legitimately organize their own societies on the basis of 
their own civic and political virtue - without any interpretation of 
their legitimacy by outsiders. Roth acknowledges cultural pluralism, 
but this cannot be equated with the ethical pluralism that flows from 
the various cultures of the world. While these cultures are not self­
contained, Roth simply wants to predicate legitimacy of governments 
on a Western state denominator - effective control of the popula­
tion.56 
Roth's only extended discussion of colonialism is contained in 
Chapter Six. This chapter is devoted to demonstrating that colonial, 
alien, and racist regimes pose a fundamental problem for his theory -
that popular will can be ascertained or construed through the media­
tion of an effective ruling apparatus or a government with de facto 
control. In his view, because of the fundamental illegitimacy of colo­
nial, racist, or alien regimes, the question of the "will of 'peoples' is al­
together removed from the question of effective control" (p. 199). 
Therefore, Roth's discussion of self-determination is an exception to 
his general thesis that, where a government has effective control over 
its population, there is a presumption of legitimacy in its favor. Ac-
56. I return to this point infra Part VI. For a review essay of Eurocentricity in interna­
tional law, see Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, supra note 4, at 184-211. 
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cording to Roth, "[w]here 'peoples' are fighting against colonial domi­
nation and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise 
of their right of self determination,' effective control carries with it no 
presumption of legitimacy, and the popular will must be ascertained 
by other criteria" (p. 199; footnote omitted). 
This is an important point. Yet, I quibble with it to the extent that 
it diminishes colonialism as ephemeral and exceptional to interna­
tional law rather than as integral, continuing, and present.57 Roth has 
a brief history of conquest to self determination - told with the aim of 
illustrating his understanding of self-determination rather than ex­
ploring the continuities between conquest, mandates, trusteeship, and 
self-determination. For example, this cursory reading is biased to the 
extent to which, in summarizing a long and complex history, it pres­
ents Woodrow Wilson's demands for self-determination to the Allied 
Powers as if self-determination was to be applied to all colonies and 
conquered territories equally. Roth presumes that Wilson's exhorta­
tion was viewed by the Central Powers as representing a "universal in­
terest" (p. 205). This could not be further from the truth. Wilson and 
General Smuts supported the exclusion of southwest Africa from the 
international supervisory mechanism (the mandate system) set up af­
ter the First World War to prepare predominantly European colonies 
for independence. African mandates such as southwest Africa were 
ranked C, the lowest in the hierarchy.58 Smuts, whose views Wilson 
shared with respect to southwest Africa and the Pacific, argued that 
these German territories were "inhabited by barbarians, who not only 
cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracti­
cal to apply any idea of political self determination in the European 
57. Roth's idea of colonialism is actual physical occupation. Hence he argues that "the 
concept of self determination has necessarily played a pivotal role in twentieth-century ef­
forts to erect a peace and security scheme that effectively outlaws conquest. Although past 
conquests underlie almost all territorial sovereignty, these efforts established the inadmissi­
bility of future conquest." P. 203 (emphasis added). 
58. According to Anghie: 
The mandate system . . .  proposed . . .  that sovereignty was hierarchical, that it could be 
graded and allocated in varying amounts to different territories depending on an assessment 
as to amounts to different territories depending on an assessment as to their state of political 
and economic advancement. All this was implied by the classification of mandates into 'A', 
'B' and 'C' regimes . . . .  The superior sovereign status enjoyed by more advanced territories, 
the 'A' mandates, was manifested in the form of greater autonomy given to these mandates." 
Hence 'A' mandates such as Palestine were regarded as possessing relatively sophisticated 
indigenous political traditions and hence were more amenable to be transformed from this 
cultural status into civilization. By contrast, the 'C' mandates like South West Africa had lit­
tle or no indigenous political sophistication and needed more guidance and control to tame 
their primordial ways. Unlike the 'A' mandates, the 'C' mandates were therefore less pre­
pared to have sovereignty over their own affairs. 
Anghie, Creating the Nation-State, supra note 39, at 238, 256, 215-87. 
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sense."59 This was essentially the same logic that was used to justify 
colonial conquest in the first place. 
Roth's brand of analysis is characterized by the idea that colonial­
ism was a rare and aberrational feature of international law. He does 
not see it as continuing, systematic, and ingrained in international law 
as we know it today. If we restrict colonialism to white political rule 
over nonwhites, as Roth does, then it is possible to understand coloni­
alism as rare and aberrational rather than contemporary and integral 
to international law. But economic disempowerment and cultural im­
perialism are only two examples of contemporary colonialism. In his 
last English-language book, Kenyan-born Ngugi Wa Thiong'o re­
minded us that the English language in former British colonies in 
Africa is a "cultural time bomb" that continues a process of erasing 
memories of precolonial cultures and history as a way of installing the 
dominance of new, more insidious forms of colonialism. 60 
While today the forms colonialism takes may be hidden, interna­
tional lawyers of the nineteenth century were far from subtle. For ex­
ample, they argued that, being different from Judeo-Christian Europe, 
Africa was culturally inferior and politically disorganized.61 This in 
turn barred Africa from membership in the family of nations and the 
benefits of protection under international law.62 Consequently, one of 
the most important ways in which international law delegitimated non­
Western societies was through racial and cultural differentiation. 
Edward Said, in another context, has called this "orientalism": a 
manner of regularized (or orientalized) writing, vision, and study, 
dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases osten­
sibly suited to the Orient, but actually tilted in favor of the Occident. 63 
59. SIBA N'ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI-SOVEREIGNS AND AFRICANS 
130-31 (1996) (quoting JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS, JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS 199 (1952)). 
60. See NGUGI WA THIONG'O, DECOLONIZING THE MIND 15-16 (1986). According to 
Thiong'o, a 
specific culture is not transmitted through language in its universality but in its particularity 
as the language of a specific community with a specific history. Written literature and ora­
ture are the main means by which a particular language transmits the images of the world 
contained in the culture it carries. 
Language as communication and as culture are then products of each other . . . .  Lan­
guage carries culture, and culture carries, particularly through orature and literature, the en­
tire body of values by which we perceive ourselves and our place in the world . • . .  Language 
is thus inseparable from ourselves as a community of human beings with a specific form and 
character, a specific history, a specific relationship to the world. 
Id. For an analysis of his earlier writings, see Josef Gugler, How Ng11gi Wa Thiong'o Shifted 
From Class Analysis to a Neo-Colonialist Perspective, 32 J.  Moo. AFR. STUD. 329 (1994). 
For an essay that influenced the title of this Review, see NGUGI WA THIONG'O, MOVING 
THE CENTER: THE STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM (1993). 
61. See M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISmON AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD 
TERRITORIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-23 (1926). 
62 See id. 
63. See SAID, supra note 6, at 41-49. 
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There is perhaps no better study of the orientalization of interna­
tional law than Antony Anghie's work. Anghie argues that colonial­
ism is central to international law particularly because its doctrines 
were constructed around a series of contrasting national identities, 
races, and languages with European ones at the apex.64 Hence, inter­
national law was less about how order was created among sovereign 
states than how it managed order among entities of completely differ­
ent cultural systems.65 
Consequently, cultural difference was a major consideration in 
whether or not an entity was considered sovereign under international 
law. Those that did not match the cultural configuration that guaran­
teed sovereignty could not possess it; they were illegitimate. Anghie 
traces how the early writings of Francisco de Vitoria, a natural-law 
theorist, and John Westlake, a positivist, justified colonial conquest 
over Africa and India.66 Their rationale was simple: these non­
Western societies did not possess the traits of statehood necessary to 
justify their enjoyment of sovereignty. This, in turn, gave legitimacy to 
colonial conquest over peoples who did not possess what was consid­
ered a necessary condition for their exercise of sovereignty. Even the 
mandate system was based on a parallel idea - that non-European 
peoples needed to be governed by outsiders since they could not gov­
ern themselves.67 Today, the idea of failed and collapsed states that 
need Western tutelage bears a striking resemblance to the denial of 
sovereignty for non-European societies under colonial rule and the 
Wilson-Smuts logic on the mandate system. Needless to say, there are 
already proposals for recolonization of failed and collapsed states.68 
Consider this genealogy: in the seventeenth century, writers 
opined that "savages" had sovereignty over the lands that they occu­
pied, no matter how much they fell outside what was considered as 
constituting civilization. These writers opined, however, that these 
savages had title only to those lands they actually occupied. Vacant 
land was legally terra nullius, open to seizure by any organized state 
64. See Anghie, Finding the Peripheries, supra note 39. 
65. See id. For a listing of many of Anghie's works, see supra note 39. 
66. Examples of their writings are FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE lNDIS ET DE lVRE 
BELLI REFLECTIONES [On the Indians Lately Discovered] (Ernest Nys & J.P. Bate trans., 
1917) (1696); JOIIN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1894). 
67. See Anghie, Creating the Nation-State, supra note 39, at 215-87. 
68. See, e.g., Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Collapsing Into Anarchy: Saving 
Failed States, 353 CURRENT 33 (1993) (arguing that U.N. policies toward collapsed states 
should be geared towards the concept of conservatorship, an effort designed to save nations 
at risk of collapsing); Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 
FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 20 (1992) (arguing that the U.N. should help failed states, possibly 
through a type of conservatorship, including the use of governance aid, U.N. trusteeship, or 
the delegation of governmental authority). 
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that discovered and occupied it.69 Hence the doctrine of discovery was 
invented to justify conquest of non-European lands. Erner de Vattel, 
writing in Switzerland in the 1750s on the basis of very scanty traveler 
accounts, conditioned sovereignty on the performance of agricultural 
work. Nomads, hunters, and gatherers held no such right.70 This doc­
trine was later used to justify expropriation of Indian land in the pres­
ent United States.71 
In the nineteenth century, a stricter definition of which societies 
constituted states was adopted in international legal thinking. Interna­
tional lawyers in the 1890s held that general cultural inferiority and 
political disorganization barred certain states (like those in tropical 
Africa) from membership in the family of nations. Westlake, for ex­
ample, wrote that they even lacked the power to sign legal treaties 
transferring their sovereignty to a European power.72 But such dis­
crimination in international law was always explicitly based on culture, 
not only or necessarily on race.73 There was also the theory that 
"lower races" deserved special or different treatment from the organ­
ized community of nations.74 Although according to this theory they 
had certain disabilities, they also had certain rights, and these were of­
ten equated with those of minors in law. The Western countries, pre­
sumed to be more developed images of what non-Western societies 
would look like in future, were seen in the role of benevolent fiduci­
aries, trustees, or guardians of non-Western societies that were pre­
sumed to be less developed.75 One outcome of this line of thought was 
the mandate system under the League of Nations between the two 
world wars, or the trusteeship council under the United Nations Char­
ter.76 
69. See SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: ACQUJSITION OF TERRITORY 
BY FORCE JN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1996). 
70. See Erner de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou, Principles de la loi naturelle, appliques a 
la conduite & aux affaires des nations & des souverains [THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR 
PRJNCJPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLJED TO THE CONDUCT & AFFAJRS OF NATIONS 
AND SOVEREJGNS] bk. I, ch. xviii (1758). 
71. See Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote: 
We will not enter into the cor>troversy, whether agriculturalists, merchants, and manufactur­
ers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to 
contract their limits. Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, 
whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original 
justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted. 
Id. at 588. 
72. See WESTLAKE, supra note 66, at 137. 
73. See, e.g., LJNDLEY, supra note 61, at 10-23. 
74. See J.A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY (1902). 
75. See Anghie, Universality and the Concept of Governance, supra note 39, at 22-34. 
76. See Anghie, Creating the Nation-State, supra note 39. 
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The roots of the post-Second World War idea of trusteeship lies 
farther back in the history of European thought. The most obvious is 
the chivalric ideal of the middle ages, when the knight incurred obliga­
tions to help the weak along with his military status.77 More important 
still was the Christian tradition, which laid a great stress on prosely­
tism from the time of Saint Paul onward, an argument pursued with 
great persuasion recently.78 If religious superiority carried an obliga­
tion to convert the heathen, cultural superiority might easily carry an 
obligation to convert the barbarian. The belief in this obligation, and 
the effort to carry it out, has also been referred to as "conversionism." 
Conversionism was broadly dominant in Western imperial thought 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, both in France and in 
England. In France, the idea of a mission civilisatrice was sporadically 
followed by moves toward the cultural assimilation of its subjects 
overseas - a policy that resulted in the countervailing notion of negri­
tude or black pride.79 In England, one of the most famous statements 
of the conversionist point of view is Macaulay's "minute" on Indian 
education, and the belief in a conversionist duty spelled out by the 
Parliamentary Committee on the Aborigines in 1837.80 
Conversionism differed from the later belief in trusteeship in cru­
cial ways. It called for missionaries, both cultural and religious, but 
not necessarily for conquest or control overseas. The obligation to 
spread Christianity and civilization was a self-imposed obligation on 
those who thought of themselves as civilized.81 There was no equiva­
lent duty or limitation on the rights of the uncivilized. They were not 
so often treated as minors in law, but as adults who would choose civi­
lization and Christianity voluntarily once it was presented to them. 
While a little coercion was called for in some variants, and some po­
tential recipients of civilization already lived in European colonies, the 
balance of duty lay with the civilizers.82 
This, then, is a simple genealogy suggesting that international law 
has historically been implicated in drawing cultural, religious, and 
77. See generally RICHARD BARBER, THE KN!GHr AND CIDv ALRY (1985). 
78. See Makau Wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing Religious 
Freedom in the African Context, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 75 (1999). 
79. See Leopold Sedar Senghor, Negritude: A Humanism of the Twentieth Century, in 
THE AFRICA READER: INDEPENDENT AFRICA 179 (Wilfred Cartey & Martin Kilson eds., 
1970). 
80. See THOMAS B. MACAULAY, SPEECHES BY LORD MACAULAY, WITH HIS 
MlNUTEs ON INDIAN EDUCATION (1935). 
81. See Mutua, supra note 78; Mutua, supra note 50. 
82. Perhaps the most important British representative of the conversionist position was 
Thomas Fowell whose ideas for the civilization of Africa are given in most detail in THE 
REMEDY: BEING A SEQUEL TO THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE (1840). His ideas regarding 
other parts of the empire appear in the published hearings of the parliamentary committee 
on aborigines 1835-37. See PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 1836, vii (538); and vii (425). 
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other boundaries to mark out what a state was and what it was not, 
and to stake out who was entitled to what protections and who was 
not. These notions in tum served to legitimize the spread of "civi­
lized" ideas of statehood to those supposedly savage, so that they 
could be brought within the history of civilization. Colonialism was 
hence justified on exactly this sort of premise. 
Although it may be too simplistic to draw analogies between the 
contemporary fad of collapsed states (which justifies foreign interven­
tion for democracy, human rights, and economic restructuring) and 
nineteenth-century international law scholarship on ideas such as terra 
nullius and civilization (defined as Western) that justified colonization, 
there is nonetheless a continuity of ideas here. There is an undeniable 
genealogy in the sense that the idea of collapsed states replicates 
nineteenth-century colonial international legal discourse. In fact, as 
recently as 1995, a leading international lawyer, Inis Claude, suggested 
that a solution to the phenomenon of collapsed states was a return to 
the trusteeship system which failed by allowing too many states to 
become independent before they were prepared for the responsibili­
ties of statehood.83 
IV. SHUTTING OFF THE ILLEGITIMACY/LEGITIMACY OF PRIVATE 
ORDERING IN ROTH'S PROPOSAL 
Roth, in Chapter Five, explores the legal consequence of non­
recognition. He asks: Do de facto regimes have the legal capacity to 
enter into binding legal agreements? What is the underlying basis 
upon which decisions should be made on the legality of their conduct? 
Roth notes that: 
By far the most significant international law issues raised by collective 
non-recognition of a government concern assertions of the state's rights 
against foreign intervention in matters "essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction" . . .  and against threats or uses of force against the state's 
political independence . . . .  
The less dramatic issues involve such questions as title to prop­
erty . . . . A related matter is the determination of whether a third party 
may lawfully purchase title to state property . . . .  [p. 154] 
Roth further argues th.at, in the absence of another competing doc­
trine, the doctrine of state necessity is a general principle of interna­
tional law that may be used for the assessment of the legal significance 
83. See Inis L. Oaude, Jr., The United Nations of the Cold War: Contrib11tions to the 
Post-Cold War Situation, 18 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 789, 790, 793 (1995). It is interesting to 
note that in 1973 Claude argued that the attention of international law had shifted from the 
problem of powerful states to the problems of weak states. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., The Cen­
tral Challenge to the United Nations: Weakening the Strong or Strengthening the Weak?, 14 
HARV. INT'LL.J. 517 (1973). 
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of acts undertaken by illegitimate regimes (p. 158). This leads him to 
another conclusion based on a public/private distinction: 
This would suggest . . .  that a de facto government would have the legal 
capacity to bind the state to treaties of a technical, apolitical nature (e.g. 
postal and aeronautical conventions), though not to partisan alliances, 
that non-controversial policies or policies consistent with those of previ­
ous legitimate governments should enjoy deference from foreign courts 
as acts of state . . . . [p. 158] 
This clear dichotomy between legal consequences that are public and 
controversial and private legal consequences that are less controver­
sial is rather troubling for its artificiality. It is based on a rather spuri­
ous distinction that suggests that the private sphere is a depoliticized 
arena, while the public sphere is a controversial and political arena. It 
is as if the private arena eclipses the politics of the public arena so that 
we can then think of issues such as property, postal, and aeronautical 
conventions as apolitical, while questions relating to collective non­
recognition appear to be "dramatic" and presumably very political in 
Roth's telling. 
Roth here replicates a common mainstream strategy: law, as op­
posed to politics, is located in spaces that do not depend on sovereign 
control and that are consensual, neutral, and hence effectual. Aero­
nautical and postal conventions are, in Roth's view, in this category. 
By contrast, Roth locates politics in the controversies surrounding the 
desirability of collective nonrecognition - in public intervention in 
civil society. This neat dichotomy between political issues and eco­
nomic issues is problematic. Its commitment to a depoliticized private 
law regime that is presumed to be consensual underplays law's consti­
tutive role. Law is constitutive of various choices since there is no 
neutral logic inherent in law for justifying one choice over another. 
Structuring different market needs or doctrinal forms is illustrative.84 
In the area of defining property, for example, choices must be made 
about how to balance the absolute freedom of an owner to do as she 
wishes with her property with the competing entitlement of her neigh­
bor to peaceful and unrestricted use of her property. Making these 
choices is inescapably political.85 
84. See Karl Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989, 
in A FOURTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET 
ECONOMIES 310 (Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994). 
85. As Kerry Rittich argues: 
[T)he distinction between public and private as a way of conceptualizing or resolving the 
problems associated with economic reform is unsatisfactory . . .  [since] concepts such as 
property • . .  tell us nothing about the substantive questions, which are the scope, type and 
structure of private interests and power which should be configured . . . .  The empowerment 
of the "private" actor signals nothing so much as a redistribution of power among different 
social groups that the state is prepared to back. This reconfiguration of entitlements and ac­
cess to social resources that characterizes restructuring will benefit some people in some 
ways, but make others, including those who benefit, worse off in some ways. 
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Dan Tarullo,86 Joel Paul,87 David Kennedy,88 and Amr Shalakany89 
argue that politics is equally present in the private realm of aeronauti­
cal and postal conventions that Roth dismisses as less dramatic and 
therefore apolitical. These scholars have shown in a variety of con­
texts the "potential for politics outside the traditional discourses of 
public authority."9() Hence: 
Defending the stability of a political order necessary for investor confi­
dence requires a set of political choices among states and among groups 
or classes within nations, as among the transnational interests of labor or 
capital or women or men. Moreover, it calls for choices among economic 
sectors with stakes in different patterns of modernization, among inves­
tors with different stakes in different patterns of production, trade and 
consumption. It is commonly said that, for example, that a global market 
"requires" an emerging market to enforce the "rule of law" to permit 
"transparency" and "predictability" in market transactions. It sounds 
very clean, egalitarian, procedural, just like apolitical background rules. 
But the alternative is neither arbitrary nor chaotic allocations, but a dif­
ferent, and often equally predictable allocation of resources, perhaps to 
local rather than foreign investors, to domestic oligarchs rather than for­
eign shareholders and vice versa.91 
Roth therefore underestimates the politics of private law projecting 
rules of private international law as neutral, since, unlike in cases of 
collective nonrecognition of governments, sovereignty is at bay in the 
private sphere. There is almost blind faith in the idea that public in­
tervention in civil society is always coercive, while the exclusivity of 
the private sphere from public power guarantees neutrality and there­
fore freedom. The power exercised by international financial institu­
tions in developing countries, however, especially in the last few years, 
to fundamentally alter their labor laws, energy policies, and budgetary 
policies, underscores the inherently interventionist and political role of 
what is otherwise presented in the rhetoric of apolitical, even-handed 
Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Gender and Distribution in the Legal Struc­
tures of Market Reform 258 (1998) (S.J.D. thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the re­
quirements of the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, Harvard Law School). 
86. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 546 (1987). 
87. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1991); Joel R. 
Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 149 (1988). 
88. See David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH 
L. REV. 7. 
89. Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias 
Under the Spectre of Neo-Liberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L LJ. 419 (2000). 
90. Kennedy, supra note 88, at 10-11. 
91. David Kennedy, "Background Noise?" The Underlying Politics of Global Govern· 
ance, 21 HARV. INT'L REV. 55 (1999). See also David Kennedy, The Disciplines of Interna· 
tional Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. OF lNT'L LAW 9 (1999). 
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functionality and economic rationality. These alterations to these 
economies have resulted in demobilizing political potential for social 
justice in areas such as, public provisioning of health care and public 
education.92 By contrast, the goals of economic growth and returns to 
profits and investments in the allocation of public resources and in de­
cisionmaking have been given preferential treatment at the expense of 
public provisioning for social justice. 93 
In addition, to suggest that questions of title to property are not as 
controversial in the context of illegitimacy, of governments is to forget 
that the entire colonial regime of international law on appropriation of 
non-European land was based upon controversial doctrines such as 
the doctrine of discovery - a doctrine based on the cultural inferiority 
of non-Western land owning and management systems. Again, just as 
he presents private issues as apolitical, Roth, in his discussion of colo­
nialism, similarly treats culture as invisible in the context of staking 
out claims such as colonial expropriations. In the context of collective 
nonrecognition of governments, however, culture raises its ugly head 
as the rules of public international law grapple to repress and manage 
ethnic, religious, and other identity claims. 
V. NONINTERVENTIONISM EXCLUDES INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC DOMINATION 
Perhaps there is no better example of Roth's silence on the coer­
cion of the private sphere than his discussion of the nonintervention 
norm in relation to nonforcible measures undertaken in the promotion 
of human rights (pp. 171-72). Roth opines that since there is no 
commonly agreed-upon thresholdO of human rights-violative conduct 
triggering permissibility of otherwise unlawful measures, let alone 
mechanisms for authoritative findings that those thresholds have been 
reached in individual cases . . . .  This uncertainty is fraught with dangers 
for weak, unpopular states at the hands of strong, influential ones, and 
one should not automatically assume (as many human rights-oriented 
writers often do) that these dangers benefit in any genuine way the cause 
of human rights. [pp. 170-71] 
This is a point very well-made, yet I find it striking that Roth ignores 
an important related question - why do human rights-oriented writ­
ers, among others, more often than not tend to presume that the non­
intervention norm does not prohibit what have been referred to as 
nonforcible measures such as the use of economic leverage? 
92 See MEREDETH TURSHEN, PRIVATIZING HEALTH SERVICES IN AFRICA (1999); 
Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the Democ­
ratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 159, 160 (1993). 
93. See Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance, supra note 11. 
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Although Roth acknowledges economic intervention is an issue, he 
is nevertheless moving from within this very limiting framework to the 
extent that his concern is which nonforcible economic measures vio­
late the nonintervention norm - and he thereby aligns himself with 
the overwhelming doctrinal reading of the nonintervention norm as 
limited to prohibiting certain interventions in the public sphere of civil 
society and in the prohibition of the use of force except in certain cir­
cumstances. The failure to read nonintervention as prohibiting eco­
nomic coercion underscores the selective reading of the norm of non­
intervention by an overwhelming majority of Western public 
international lawyers. This prevailing tendency that fails to recognize 
economic coercion as a form of intervention follows from a widely 
embraced idea in international law that, in the exercise of their eco­
nomic freedom, countries do not breach the nonintervention norm. 
Consequently, intervention under the United Nations Charter has 
largely been limited to restrictions on interference with matters that 
are essentially within the jurisdiction of a state, and to the prohibition 
of the use of force except in cases where there has been a "threat to 
the peace," "breach of the peace," or an "act of aggression."94 
There are at least two norms of international law that guide the 
definition of the scope of permissible forms of restrictions on eco­
nomic interactions between states. In the first view, international law 
permits states to impose acts of retorsion on other states. Acknowl­
edging the right of a state to impose an act of retorsion follows from 
the strict view that each country has a sovereign right not only to de­
termine with which countries it may have economic interactions, but 
also to impose whatever economic restrictions it wishes on other 
states. 
The second view holds that, if a norm prohibiting the exercise of 
economic coercion between states exists, the exercise of one country's 
economic sovereignty against another could be considered a legitimate 
reprisal or countermeasure. In other words, although a countermea­
sure is an illegal act, if used in self-defense it is deemed legally permis­
sible as self-help.95 
These norms of international law reveal the absence of a clear 
statement restricting the interventionary economic programs pro­
moted by powerful states and International Financial Institutions 
(IFis ).96 This is unsurprising since the nonintervention norm applies to 
94. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
95. See OMER ELGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTER-MEASURES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1988). 
96. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27). 
The Court, without much guidance on what it had relied upon, stated that it was unable to 
find that United States' measures such as elimination of bilateral assistance, the reduction of 
sugar imports, blocking loans from international financial organizations, and ultimately the 
prohibition of export/import trade between the two countries and the barring of Nicaraguan 
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relations between states rather than between nonstate actors such as 
the IFis and states. However, the nonintervention norm reflects in­
ternational law's laissez-faire attitude towards economic interactions. 
Under this view, only states can legitimately impose restrictions on 
relations with each other.97 It is against this background that economic 
sanctions are considered legitimate avenues of international· censure, 
to discipline what may be considered "errant" states both by individ­
ual states and by groups of states through IF!s.98 
In addition, an international free-market economy is generally re­
garded as enhancing, rather than compromising, international peace 
and security.99 This view is not necessarily true in all situations. The 
role played by economic restructuring in the violent collapse of the 
former Yugoslavia, for example, cannot be understated.100 
My point, however, is that the normative authority of the sources 
from which the nonintervention norm is derived is a major way by 
which international law excludes activities of IFis from its scrutiny. 
This happens through the failure to recognize economic coercion as a 
violation of the nonintervention norm, since such an argument cannot 
be made on the basis of neither custom nor treaty.101 
Outside the realm of treaty and custom, however, a number of 
United Nations General Assembly resolutions recognize that eco­
nomic coercion violates national economic sovereignty and therefore 
the nonintervention norm. Legal opinion in many developing coun-
vessels from United States ports, constituted "breach of the customary-law principle of non­
intervention." Id. at para. 245. 
97. The U.N. Charter provides for the sovereign equality of all states. U.N. CHARTER 
art. 2, para. 1. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States explicitly extends the 
meaning of sovereignty to incorporate the idea of economic independence. Chapter 1 (b) 
provides: "Economic as well as political and other relations among States shall be governed, 
inter alia, by the following principles . . .  sovereign equality of all states." Charter of Eco­
nomic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3821, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 
50, U.N. Doc. N9631 (1974). 
98. There is also a view that, as a practical matter, much of a typical state's international 
trade involves a form of coercion. See, e.g., D.W. Bowett, International Law and Economic 
Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 248 (1976). But see Tom Farer, Political and Economic Coer­
cion in Contemporary International Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1985). Farer argues that 
taking into account the at best inconclusive character of the definitional exercise [under Ar­
ticle 2(4) of the U.N. Charter], the clear language of the Declaration of Friendly Relations, 
the earlier General Assembly resolution on nonintervention prohibiting "measures of an 
economic and compelling character to force the will of the State" and taking into account as 
well the language of the O.A.S. Charter, I conclude that under some conceivable conditions, 
economic coercion can be a violation of international law even where the means employed 
do not themselves violate any treaty. 
Id. at 411. 
99. See Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions 
after the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L LJ. 443 (1997). 
100. See id.; SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION 
AFTER THE COLD WAR 148 (1995). 
101. See STATIITE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(1 )( c ). 
2030 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1996 
tries shares this interpretation of the nonintervention norm under Ar­
ticle 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. This argument is further for­
tified by the view that economic coercion is prohibited under Article 
2( 4) of the UN Charter, since it constitutes a violation of the prohibi­
tion on unlawful threat or use of force.102 
This interpretation of the nonintervention norm is primarily de­
rived from the following United Nations General Assembly resolu­
tions: 
• Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Amongst States in Accor­
dance with the Charter of the United Nations;103 
• Resolution of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources;104 
• Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.105 
The dominant interpretation given to the nonintervention norm, how­
ever, holds that international law does not necessarily recognize a 
norm prohibiting economic coercion. Why is this so? 
International legal opinion, especially in the West, does not regard 
economic coercion as intervention, since the definition of intervention 
contained in treaties and custom does not include economic coercion. 
On this view, international law excludes economic coercion as a part 
of the nonintervention norm, since it restricts the sources of the nonin­
tervention norm to treaty and custom. This excludes as sources of in­
ternational law United Nations General Assembly resolutions that de­
clare that economic coercion constitutes a part of the nonintervention 
norm. This position is upheld on the assumption that the United Na­
tions General Assembly does not have legislative authority to enact 
international law. As such, its resolutions cannot be regarded as 
authoritative sources of international law. This is especially the case 
when there are objections to the resolutions on the assembly floor. In 
addition, the resolutions are neither evidence of treaties nor state 
102. See Bhupinder Chimni, Towards A Third World Approach to Non-Intervention: 
Through the Labyrinth of Western Doctrine, 20 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 243, 255 (1980). 
103. G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc A/6220 (1965). 
This declaration fortifies the 1965 General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 290 (IV), U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., 
at 13, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 13 (1949). Paragraph 2 of this latter declaration provides: "No 
state may use or encourage the use of economic, political, or any other type of measures to 
coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sover­
eign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind." The former calls upon states to re­
frain from "any forcible action" that deprives people of self-determination, equal rights, and 
freedom and independence. It further provides that "armed intervention and all other forms 
of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its politi­
cal, economic, and cultural elements, are in violation of international law." 
104. G.A. Res. 2635, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 126, U.N. Doc. A/8028 
(1970). 
105. G.A. Res. 3821, supra note 97, at 50. 
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practice evidencing custom.106 This is the position Roth takes in sub­
scribing to the view that the New International Economic Order did 
not rise to the status of international law (p. 168).107 
An alternative view, however, regards General Assembly resolu­
tions recognizing economic coercion as embodying a normative source 
of binding international law.108 According to this view, General As­
sembly resolutions can result in more rapid formation of norms than 
would occur through the regular process of development of "interna­
tional custom" or the strict formality of a specific international con­
vention or treaty.109 The advantage of admitting new sources that 
permit greater expedition in formation of international legal norms is 
that it enhances the ability of the United Nations to deal with new or 
unanticipated developments.U0 
There is in fact a legal basis for admitting General Assembly reso­
lutions as sources of international law. Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice specifies a source of international 
law other than treaty and custom: general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations.111 For example, expanding sources through gen­
eral principles of international law, it has been argued, constitutes a 
source of norms of human rights law.112 Some jurists have argued that 
the Article 38(1)(c) source of international law was written with an 
106. On the legal significance of United Nations General Assembly resolutions and po­
litical statements, see Richard Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General As­
sembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966); Rosalyn Higgins, The United Nations and Law Mak­
ing: The Political Organs, 64 AM. J. INT'LL. 37 (1970). 
107. The New International Economic Order was an effort initiated by developing 
countries for, inter alia, the restructuring of international economic relations to establish a 
balance between their predominantly raw-material-producing economies and Western in­
dustrial and now increasingly service-oriented economies. 
108. See, e.g., NICO SCHRINER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL REsOURCES (1997); 
see also B.S. Chimni, The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: To­
ward a Radical Interpretation, 38 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 208, 214 (1998) (review of NICO 
SCHRUVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL REsOURCES). Chimni argues that, to appreci­
ate the principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, one has to look to the 
material, rather than the formal and statist interpretations, of international law. Under this 
view, it is evident that third-world countries, since 1975, have abandoned nationalist bour­
geois projects such as those relating to PSNR because those projects participate within the 
oppressive and neocolonial international legal system. Under this system, the rights of for­
eign investors and foreign capital are heavily protected at the expense of the developing 
countries' ability to use their resources to expand the welfare of their citizens and protect the 
rights of the victims of transnational capital activities. See generally B.S. Cm:MNI, IN­
TERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 
(1993). 
109. See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 1-148. 
110. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 547 
(1993). 
111. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(1)(c). 
112 See Bruno Sintma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, 
Jus Cogens and General Principles, 12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 82 (1992). 
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aim of preventing the International Court of Justice from basing rul­
ings upon subjective principles of justice. Such a broad power, ac­
cording to this prevailing opinion, would inject subjectivity into the 
sources of international law and would be mistrusted by govern­
ments.113 Yet, subjectivity is perhaps the staple food of legal argu­
ment, even in the adjudicative context, since gaps, contradictions, and 
ambiguities inexorably require judges to make choices.114 In addition, 
even the so-called objective sources of international law, such as cus­
tom, have been invoked to legitimate bullying, such as the U.S. inva­
sion of Panama.U5 
The nonintervention norm can be and has been construed to the 
effect that economic coercion violates it. This interpretation is unsur­
prisingly held widely in third-world international legal and political 
opinion. During the 1960s and 1970s, third-world majorities on the 
floor of the General Assembly dominated the debate and resolution 
process.116 It was during this period that a number of resolutions call­
ing for prohibition of economic coercion were passed. The over­
whelming response of Western countries, including the United States, 
was that United Nations General Assembly resolutions were not a 
source of international law. Another response was to acknowledge 
these resolutions as merely soft law since they failed to command a 
sufficient level of legality. The ostensible reason for this was that 
there was relatively little international consensus over them.117 
113. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 15-16 (4th 
ed. 1990). Brownlie notes that Article 38(1)(c) of the Statue of the International Court of 
Justice has been used sparingly for rules of evidence, rules of procedure, or jurisdictional 
questions. Brownlie argues that Article 38(1)(c) was never intended to be the basis of ma­
jor, new substantive norms in international law. See also Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy 
of the Sources of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273 (1974-75). Akehurst argues 
that general principles of international law are not a source of international law, but rather 
"simply broad principles, such as the principle of diplomatic immunity or the principle of the 
freedom of the seas; most of them are principles of customary international law . . • .  " Id. at 
278. 
114. See KENNEDY, supra note 51, at 1. 
115. See Antony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyr­
anny, 84 AM. J. INT'LL. 516 (1990). 
116. See Richard Falk, Introduction, The American Attack on the United Nations: An 
Interpretation, 16 HARV. J. INT'L L. 566, 568 (1975); see also Progressive Development of the 
Principles and Norms of International Law Relating to the New International Economic Or­
der, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Agenda Item 5, at 4, U.N. Doc A/39/504/Add.1 (1984) (pro­
viding a good example of an argument in favor of taking general assembly resolutions as a 
source of international law); Farer, supra note 98, at 408 (defining economic coercion as "ef­
forts to project influence across frontiers by denying or conditioning access to a country's 
resources, raw materials, semi- or finished products, capital, technology, services or consum­
ers"). 
117. This bifurcation of legal claims (representing the status quo) on the one hand, and 
moral claims or soft law (deviations from the status quo or challenges to it) on the other 
hand, can be argued as reflecting a liberal strategy for perpetuating an unjust status quo by 
adopting the political posture that opposing claims may in time become legal principles 
when they attain or command a sufficient level of legality. 
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My argument, then, is that the contemporary understanding of the 
nonintervention norm subscribed to by Roth is limited to the extent 
that sources of international law are restricted to treaty and custom. 
This selective recognition of the sources of international law excludes 
economic coercion as part of our understanding of unjustified inter­
vention under the nonintervention norm. The focus on the source of 
international law's normative authority limits a broader or expansive 
definition of the nonintervention norm that accommodates economic 
coercion much in the same way that it bars interference with matters 
that are essentially within the jurisdiction of a state or the unlawful use 
of force. International law's normative authority is determined by the 
doctrine of sources through which international law defines what does 
or does not become a new norm. Consequently, in limiting new norms 
to custom and treaty rather than to general principles, for example, in­
ternational law in effect perpetuates the status quo and preempts any 
radical rereading or reconfiguration of its norms in favor of develop­
ing countries.118 
In so doing, the nonintervention norm protects the agenda of pow­
erful and wealthy countries and nonstate actors, such as the IFis, 
which currently fundamentally redefine third-world countries by vir­
tue of their economic leverage over them.119 In that way, international 
legal norms are decontextualized from the lived realities of peoples 
around the world - international law then remains a formal but a 
formidable mechanism for parceling out competences without regard 
to their material or distributional implications.12° 
As seen by its Western interlocutors, international law is, and 
should remain, deeply committed to ensuring that the international 
political economy is safeguarded from all forms of redistributive inter­
ventionism that would interfere with the automatic progress, dyna-
118. See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INfERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER (1979). Bedjaoui notes that international law 
must thus accept the challenge being made to it both by the structural disorder of the world 
economy and by the deeply felt desire of all peoples for a new international economic order. 
However, it is perfectly clear that to satisfy such hopes and to meet the needs of the interna­
tional community seeking for this new order, international law cannot properly and effec­
tively and effectively undertake its own transformation if it confines itself to its traditional 
sources alone, i.e. custom, treaties and general legal principles. The inadequacy of the tradi­
tional ways of forming the rules of international law is very sharply felt at the present time. 
What is to done if not to make use of other sources? 
Id. at 128. 
119. See Cahn, supra note 92, at 159-60. 
120. Antony Carty is critical of approaches to international law that decontextualize in­
ternational law from its historical and material specificity. See ANTONY CARTY, THE 
DECAY OF INfERNATIONAL LAW? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LIMITS OF LEGAL 
IMAGINATION IN lNfERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 4 (1986). For a Marxist take, see B.S. Chimni, 
Marxism and International Law: A Contemporary Analysis, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Feb. 6, 
1999, at 337. 
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mism, and productivity of the market.121 While it therefore seems that 
international law has a well-articulated defense against redistributive 
interventionism inimical to free markets, it is hostile to accommodat­
ing a countervailing optic that would examine the distributional costs 
of the market's inability to spread its goodies around efficiently, opti­
mally, or even equitably. In doing so, international law reinforces the 
fallacious vision of a universal economic order operating on more or 
less automatic self-regulating lines, while simultaneously de­
legitimating the power and authority of the nation-state 1) to protect 
its citizens from want through regulatory controls such as interest 
rates, taxes, and subsidies, and 2) to tame the inexorable march of the 
market so that a balance between social spending and investment pro­
grams could be entrusted to the hands of govemment.122 
VI. ROTH BREAKS DOWN POST-COLD WAR LINEAR STORIES ON 
BREAKDOWN OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Notwithstanding these implications of Roth's neoconservatism, an 
important outcome of his analysis is the effort to transcend the debate 
in liberal international theory in the post-Cold War period that has fo­
cused on legitimating the telling of a linear and unidimensional tale: 
the classical conception of sovereignty as a consolidated and unified 
unit formalizing the boundary between the national and the interna­
tional has broken down or is breaking down or is in the process of ero­
sion and reformulation.123 Consequently, and on this view, states can 
no longer justify repression of individual rights on the basis of their 
exclusive sovereignty within their domestic jurisdictions as they did in 
121. See Norbert Horn, Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order, 16 
J. WORLD TRADE L. 338, 343 (1982). Horn observes that the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) wrongly sought to extend the legal concept of sovereignty to economic as­
pects. Similarly, Schwarzenberger argues that the ideology of the Principle of Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources was no more than a "convenient para-legal ideology of 
power economics." See Chimni, The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 108, at 
208 (describing Schrijver rejecting this view). 
Robert Jackson argues that the NIEO "was unduly ambitious in that it attempted to re­
place free trade and cumulative justice with economic democracy and distributive justice." 
ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
THE THIRD WORLD 202 (1991). 
122. I tell this story in James Thuo Gathii, Empowering the Poor While Protecting the 
Powerful: A Critique of Good Governance Proposals (1999) (unpublished S.J.D. disserta­
tion, Harvard Law School) (on file with the author). 
123. It is noteworthy that the theme of the decline and demise of sovereignty is not con­
fined to the post-Cold War period. See, e.g., RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: 
THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971) (arguing that the nation-state 
was destroyed by the multinational enterprise); see also ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND 
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 220 (1975); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, 
POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLmCS IN TRANsmoN 3 (1977); Saul 
Mendlovitz, On the Creation of a Just World Order: An Agenda for a Program of Inquiry 
and Praxis, Vol. 8 ALTERNATIVES, (Winter, 1980-1981). 
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, 
the 1960s and 1970s.124 The new democratic entitlement that Roth 
takes issue with holds that, under the post-Cold War international or­
der, individual liberty or the sovereign individual is the ultimate 
source of legitimacy in the liberal democratic order of good govern­
ance. 
Roth seeks to break this unidimensional telling by examining the 
emergence of what he suggests to be a new norm - governmental il­
legitimacy of international law. This new norm, according to Roth, 
challenges the classical understandings of sovereignty that the demo­
cratic entitlement school (which he discredits) also challenges. The 
purpose of the book is therefore that of subjecting "collective non­
recognition of governments to painstaking and systematic examina­
tion," which the author states is "underexplored and undertheorized 
as a question in international law" (p. xi). In international legalese, 
the question that Roth sets out to answer is "when is a de facto 
authority to be considered a government for the purpose of interna­
tional law?"125 His aim is "to reach a conclusion on the 'current state 
of the positive international law of governmental illegitimacy.' "126 
Roth's project may therefore be summarized as a persuasion for bal­
ancing, if not blunting, the moralism of the democratic entitlement as 
the basis of government legitimacy with the reality of a norm of gov­
ernmental illegitimacy based on interpretations of de facto control.127 
The resulting balance, perhaps more inclined in favor of de facto con­
trol, offers the lowest common denominator for governmental legiti­
macy in a world of plural cultures and societies. To illustrate: 
124. See Gregory Fox, New Approaches to International Human Rights: The Sovereign 
State Revisited, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 105 (Sohail H. Hashmi ed., 1997). Fox notes that "international law no longer 
permits states to defend violations of fundamental human rights as legitimate exercises of 
national sovereignty." Id. at 115. 
125. P. xv. This reference comes from the foreword authored by Oscar Schachter 
[hereinafter, Schachter Foreword]. 
126. P. xvi (Schachter Foreword). 
127. Roth accepts the "the increased significance of empirical manifestations of popular 
will in ad hoc evaluations of governmental legitimacy, but denies that this development en­
tails the emergence of a liberal-democratic 'legitimism.' " P. 4. Similarly, in discussing the 
constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition, Roth argues that 
some concession to the realpolitik of international relations is essential if international law is 
to be taken seriously as a framework for actual state behavior, as opposed to mere wishful 
moralizing on the part of natural law theorists . . . .  [I]n order for there to be the necessary 
unity of legal and factual relationships, brute force must be permitted to create and destroy 
legal relationships, but not limitlessly." 
P. 125. Roth, however, is also of the view "that international law's moralistic component 
is essential to its very efficacy." P. 182. Yet, it is also Roth's view that "the prospect of a 
new democratic legitirnism replacing the effective control doctrine . . .  [would result in] 
radically transforming the sovereign equality scheme." P. 189. Roth further opines that 
the effective control doctrine, "though not by itself rising to the level of jus cogens, is the 
present method for interpreting a scheme that features as a peremptory norm the inad­
missibility of the use of force against the political independence of states." P. 189. 
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[A]s the actors to be reckoned with in the international system become 
more numerous and come to represent more diverse interests, interna­
tional law norms come under increasing pressure to embody truly gen­
eral principles rather than a fortuitous overlap of the interests of a pow­
erful few . . . .  The moralistic rules calculated to legitimate the essence of 
the status quo generate, paradoxically, standards that progressively en­
croach on the prerogatives of the powerful. This is not to say that inter­
national law has become a strictly moral order . . . .  It is, however, to deny 
the irrelevance of moralistic standards to international relations, and 
thus to deny that any pragmatic account of international law takes the 
legitimacy of de facto power as a given. [p. 10] 
Roth's narrative is not one of a simplistic ossification of the classical 
doctrines of sovereignty and nonintervention, and progress towards a 
nirvana in which protection of individual rights of self-determined in­
dividuals has superceded the constraints imposed by the reification of 
the state and of state sovereignty. It is a project that seeks to infuse a 
sense of moralism into one of international law's touchstones - sov­
ereignty. Rather than understanding sovereignty as a dry, amoral 
safeguard of statism, Roth reads popular sovereignty into this classical 
understanding of sovereignty. The location of sovereignty therefore 
moves from the state to the people. In this sense, therefore, Roth's 
narrative flirts with the contemporary fascination of progress that 
traces the upending of classical sovereignty by popular sovereignty not 
so surreptitiously.128 Roth delves into political theory, jurisprudence 
and constitutionalism, and a variety of cases to demonstrate that in­
ternational legal scholarship has failed to acknowledge that, while it 
may be true that legitimation of governance is today increasingly 
moving towards the ideal of the will of the people, governmental ille­
gitimacy is perhaps better determined by realism (whether a govern­
ment has de facto control as an indication of the acquiescence or will 
128. Pp. 11-15. Roth su=arizes what he calls the "progression of legal standards re-
garding the legitimacy . . . .  " P. 11. Here is a classic example of this progression rendition: 
Two conceptual transformations thus paradoxically result from enshrining sovereignty in 
law, i.e. from the pursuit of peace based on the legal inviolability of the territorial integrity 
and political independence of recognized states. The first is a reconceptualization of the 
elemental units of the international system as, not territorial units or state apparatuses, but 
political communities or 'peoples', defined pragmatically as the inhabitants of relatively sta­
ble (even if coercive) political entities. State apparatuses are taken to be the expressions of 
those political communities, and their territorial claims are the claims of the communities 
they are thought to represent. Theoretically, then, state sovereignty is popular sovereignty, 
though the state apparatus may in most circumstances be irrebuttably presumed to represent 
the people over whom it exercises de facto control. Second, sovereignty itself no longer en­
tails absolute discretion on matters within the domestic jurisdiction, as states are pressured 
to consent to obligations regarding the treatment of groups within their territories. 
P. 12 (citations omitted). This narrative embodies progression to the extent to which it 
sees "sovereignty as part of some linear evolution of history, destined for the rise, pre­
eminence and eventual fall as if mirroring the progression of the seasons." Mark Owen 
Lombardi, Third-World Problem-Solving and the 'Religion' of Sovereignty: Trends and 
Prospects, in MARK E. DENHAM & MARK OWEN LOMBARDI, PERSPECTIVES ON THIRD 
WORLD SOVEREIGNTY: THE POST MODERN PARADOX 153 (1996). 
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of the people) than by idealism (the fact that the will of the people has 
been expressed through their exercise of participatory rights by voting 
- or expressing their sovereignty - in a government of their choice 
as guaranteed by international human rights conventions). 
Roth is therefore skeptical of the increasing importance of individ­
ual rights and self-determination internationally, which "appear to 
point to liberal democracy as the basis for a norm of governmental le­
gitimacy"129 - a view with which he expresses great discomfort.130 In 
brief, Roth seems to suggest that the increasing importance of the will 
of the people in legitimation of governments is mistakenly seen to be 
the result of conceptual developments by proponents of the new 
democratic entitlement norm. Roth disputes this reading of interna­
tional law by predicating it less on the conceptual developments of the 
sovereignty doctrine and more on the "principle of governmental ille­
gitimacy." 
Governmental illegitimacy is not necessarily a liberal democratic 
notion. Roth traces notions of governmental illegitimacy as much to 
Rousseau as to Locke, the result of which is to discredit any preemi­
nence of liberal democracy over other sources of governmental legiti­
macy such as those within revolutionary dictatorships as in the East. 
In fact, Roth argues that the principle of governmental illegitimacy 
preceded the presumed developments of the sovereignty doctrine. As 
the forward to the book notes, the fact that the principle of govern­
mental illegitimacy came prior to the emergence of the democratic en­
titlement cannot be denied.131 Roth discusses how collective denial of 
recognition primarily on the basis that such regimes lacked effective 
control over their territories - rather than on the basis that such re­
gimes failed to pass the contemporary litmus test of reflecting the "will 
of the people" through popular elections - indicates that the princi­
ple of governmental illegitimacy may have matured into a new norm. 
Roth interprets failure to recognize governments for failing to have 
129. P. xvi (Schachter Foreword). 
130. Similar views have been expressed by critical legal scholars as well as anti­
colonially inclined third-world scholars. See e.g., Obiora Okafor, Is there a Legitimacy Defi­
cit in International Legal Scholarship and Practice, 13 !NT'L INSIGHTS 91 (1997); Obiora C. 
Okafor, The Concept of Legitimate Governance in the Contemporary International Legal 
System, 44 NETHERLANDS INT'L L.R. 33 (1997); Nathaniel Berman, The Paradoxes of Le­
gitimacy: Case Studies in International Legal Modernism, 32 HARV. !NT'L L.J. 583 (1991) 
(book review); Obiora Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimacy: International Law, Multilateral 
Institutions and the Question of Socio-Cultural Fragmentation Within African States (1998) 
(thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of Law, University of British Columbia). For an overview of several 
perspectives, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Global Process of Legitimation and the Le­
gitimacy of Global Governance, 14 ARIZ. J. lNT'L. & COMP. L. 117; Quashigah, supra note 
22. For a particularly insightful summary of the limitations and paradoxes of legitimacy as 
an emerging touchstone of both political and legal debate, see Karin Mickleson, Afterword: 
Challenging Legitimacy, in LEGIDMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA, supra note 22, at 559. 
131. P. xvii (Schachter Foreword). 
2038 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1996 
effective control over their territory as being consistent with the no­
tion of the will of the people. In Roth's view, the requirement that a 
government have effective control over its people in order to be rec­
ognized reflects "a principled respect for the decision of the people to 
acquiesce in the regime."132 
Roth's assertion that de facto control can be construed as a reflec­
tion of the will of the people is one of the most important arguments 
he advances to debunk the overdetermination of the moralism of the 
democratic entitlement school. Roth seems to marry the moral ideal­
ism of the democratic entitlement school with his own brand of real­
ism - in effect blunting the liberal triumphalism of the post-Cold War 
period. 
Although Roth's analysis proceeds from the premise that a gov­
ernment that does not reflect the will of the people is illegitimate in 
international law, he is skeptical of proposing an enforceable legal 
norm - he is worried that if a norm of governmental illegitimacy were 
acknowledged, it would soon fall into disrepute, since its potential for 
abuse would be so great. This makes Roth look like a conservative 
realist - one not ready to give too much weight to idealistic criteria 
for the determination of the legitimacy of governments. For example, 
Roth notes that such a norm would be used to deny (nondemocratic) 
governments legitimacy on the basis of a liberal democratic creed that 
is not widely shared in today's "pluralist international society of di­
verse cultures and histories."133 Roth is worried that such a norm 
would also give powerful countries a basis for justified international 
intervention, a prospect for which Roth has no patience. In fact, per­
haps Roth's biggest opposition from liberal internationalists will be his 
argument in favor of the continued relevance of de facto control as an 
indicator of governmental legitimacy. The effort of the book in pro­
posing a new law on governmental illegitimacy then seems to falter 
once the author acknowledges its futility or disutility as a predictable 
norm. 
For this reason, the argument that a new norm on governmental 
illegitimacy would be so susceptible to abuse as to render it unpredict­
able should be no surprise to Roth. Yet, Roth wants to make it look 
like a perplexing or even vexing proposition to the extent that it would 
have no consensus among states. Roth's perplexity and vexation seem 
to arise from his commitment to the idea that "almost all states -
large and small, rich and poor, strong and weak - accept [many] of 
[the] normative . . .  core principles embodied in the United Nations 
Charter and repeated without deviation in a multitude of treaties and 
declarations" (p. 6). Agreeing with Hedley Bull, Roth emphasizes 
132. P. xvii (Schachter Foreword). 
133. P. xviii (Schachter Foreword). 
May 2000] Neoliberalism, Colonialism 2039 
that, where a violation of these principles occurs, " 'the offending state 
usually goes out of its way to demonstrate that it considers itself (and 
other states) bound by the rule in question.' "134 In Roth's view, most 
states conduct their affairs on the basis of certain accepted principles 
(referred to variously as principles, rules, and norms) as a "common 
reference point" (p. 7). Notwithstanding these observations about the 
pervasiveness of a core set of commitments for the maintenance of in­
ternational peace and security after the Second World War, Roth still 
has an overbearing impatience with the liberal triumphalist reification 
of the "will of the people" as a new locus of the legitimacy of states in­
sofar as it fails to accommodate the reality of whether or not such a 
government has effective control or the acquiescence of its people. 
Yet, although Roth is critical of the democratic entitlement school 
for its idealism, his conception of the will of the people is not different 
from that of his identified nemesis - proponents of the new demo­
cratic entitlement. For Roth, sovereignty is transformed. It "is now 
popular sovereignty, predicated on the principle of self-determination 
of peoples, and qualified sovereignty, limited by an increasing list of 
international obligations . . .  pertaining to the treatment of subjects" 
(p. 14). This view of sovereignty as the new basis of legitimacy for 
governments is based neither entirely on the liberal internationalist 
argument of the ascendancy of international treaty norms of citizen 
participation in elections, nor on the realism of a government with de 
facto control of its territory. Yet, insofar as Roth also predicates his 
view of legitimacy on popular sovereignty or self-determination of a 
people (as may be evidenced by their submission or acquiescence to a 
government of their choice), his proposal of a norm of illegitimacy of 
governments is the reverse of those arguing in favor of a democratic 
entitlement for citizens. Both Roth and his antagonists are all for the 
same thing - to decenter sovereignty from its state centricism by re­
interpreting it as popular sovereignty or self-determination of peoples. 
Roth is the flip side of the liberal internationalists, since he de­
emphasizes the moral commitments of the International Bill of Rights 
as the source of legitimacy or illegitimacy for governments (his em­
phasis lies in construing sovereignty from whether a government has 
de facto control over its people, for example ),135 but he is nevertheless 
134. P. 6 {footnote omitted). Hedley Bull, an Australian political scientist, is one of the 
leading thinkers in international relations. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCIDCAL SOCIETY 
(1977); Hedley Bull, Society and Anarchy in International Relations, in DIPLOMATIC IN­
VESTIGATIONS 35 (H. Butterfield & M. Wight eds., 1968). 
135. Roth states this position as follows: 
[T]he concept of "self determination of peoples" that underlies sovereignty is increasingly 
interpreted in the context of the international obligations that qualify sovereignty. The in­
ternational community has come to understand a "people" less as an abstraction, the bearer 
of a unitary will authoritatively expressed by whatever state apparatus of domestic origin ex­
erts de facto control over the territory, and more as a collection of persons possessing a right 
to participate in determining their own form of government, a right that the state apparatus 
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committed to a norm of illegitimacy predicated on people rather than 
states as the source of sovereignty (p. 170). 
One reason why Roth is unable to reconcile his proposal of a new 
law of illegitimacy of governments with the possibility of its potential 
abuse arises from his observation that it is impossible to reconcile the 
liberal commitment to the "will of the people" with the reality of one­
party states and dictatorships - even in the post-Cold War liberal era 
(pp. 72-73). This factual detail, the inconsistency of desired norm and 
actual praxis, is then one of his most important points of departure in 
finding his proposed norm inadequate. 
VII. ROTH ON STATEHOOD: WHAT OF THE NATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
After rehashing the "well-rehearsed"136 debate on constitutive and 
declaratory theories of recognition, Roth defines statehood: 
A state is essentially a political community (within whatever territorial 
boundaries) that existing states collectively decide ought to be self­
goveming. True, agreement on this 'ought' is most likely to be found 
where that political community (within those boundaries) has been self­
goveming in the recent past, both because the peace and security sys­
tem's status quo orientation naturally leads it to champion the immediate 
status quo ante and because no alternative principles are likely to find 
consensus. Yet where agreement can be founded on another basis, such 
as the widely perceived illegitimacy of overseas colonialism and undesir­
ability of fragmentation, the result is not different in kind. [p.131; foot­
note omitted] 
In Roth's view, the state is a doctrinal entity. It is a political commu­
nity. It must be stripped of any ethnic, religious, or other affective es­
sence. The condition sine qua non for its exercise of state power is a 
government or an apparatus exercising state power within it (p. 130). 
Roth does not consider it necessary to recognize what Antony Carty 
has identified as "the institutional, cultural (national) and ideological 
dimensions of the State,"137 since he adopts a formal view of the state 
that is decontextualized and ahistorical. He abstracts the state from 
the nation, despite the fact that the two have been almost inseparable 
is obliged to respect and effectuate. It is this phenomenon that has caused some observers 
(mistakenly, in my view) to identify the developing norm of popular sovereignty with liberal 
democracy. 
Pp. 14-15. 
136. See Karen Knop, The 'Righting' of Recognition: Recognition of States in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, in State Sovereignty: The Challenge of a Changing World, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INT'L L., Oct. 15-17, 1992, at 36, 3841. 
137. Antony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of Interna­
tional Law, 2 EUR. J. INT'LL. 82 (1991). 
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over the last century.138 In the nineteenth century, European states 
created nations.139 In the twentieth century, one may argue that na­
tions have more often than not claimed to have a right to their own 
states. Self-determination came to be understood as a means of deal­
ing with the backwardness exemplified by the violence of nationalism, 
particularly in Africa and Asia.140 States would usher these tribal so­
cieties into modernity, and move them away from and beyond tradi­
tion. 
Nationalism, in the variety of its guises, suggests a consistent ten­
dency to equate the boundaries of government with the state. In one 
of its Eurocentric guises, nationalism has it that a necessary condition 
of free institutions is that the boundaries of government should coin­
cide with those of nationalities.141 There are perhaps similarities that 
can be traced between European and non-European nationalism: the 
presumption that nationalism supplies the determination of the unit of 
population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own; that hu­
manity is divided into nations by virtue of certain characteristics that 
can be ascertained and are exclusively inherent in it and that is the 
only legitimate form of self-determination (hence each nation is dis­
tinct from another culturally, linguistically, and in other outward sym­
bols of life); the requirement of uniformity and enforcement of belief 
policy/goals/values among members; and preoccupation with a glori­
ous past and a more glorious future, where past greatness is appealed 
to in order to warrant subversion of present and existing institutions, 
hence past greatness is related to present degradation.142 
By resorting to a legalistic conception of the state, Roth under­
plays how nationalism in postcolonial societies is so central to under­
standing these countries. In a historical perspective, it is pertinent to 
observe that European imperialism in non-Western societies in the 
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries coincided with the height of 
the nationalist moment in Europe. That Roth therefore underplays 
138. Roth, however, discusses in passing how attribution of a unitary will within a coun­
try with minorities clainiing statehood has posed a problem in international law. He attrib­
utes international law's inability to address this problem to its tendency to confer on mem­
bers of groups individual rights while leaving intact the sovereignty of the larger political 
communities within which these minorities find themselves. P. 194. 
139. See ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); ERIC HOBSBAWM, 
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1990); ANTIIONY D. SMITH, THE ETHNIC 
ORIGINS OF NATIONS (1986). For a critique of the Eurocentric approaches to the study of 
Nationalism, see Gopal Balakrishnan, The National Imagination, in BALAKRISHNAN GOPAL 
& BENEDICT ANDERSON, MAPPING TIIE NATION (1996) and DAWA NORBU, CULTURE 
AND TIIE PoLmcs OF THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM (1992). 
140. See ELIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM 25-30 (3d ed. 1966). 
141. See John Stuart Mill, Considerations of Representative Government, quoted in 
Benedict Anderson, Mapping the Nation, in MAPPING TIIE NATION, supra note 139. 
142 See KEDOURIE, supra note 140, at 70-71, 84-85, 105-06. 
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the idea of the nation in his analysis of states and governments is tell­
ing for both European and non-European societies. 
Nationalism, like narratives about legitimacy of governments, is 
regarded as an invention of Europe and therefore a mark of European 
achievement.143 Imperialism and colonial occupation were thought 
morally justifiable under this discourse of European identity, since 
being non-European was equated with being backward, primitive, and 
prehistoric.144 Non-European societies were therefore regarded as fal­
ling outside the purview of nations enjoying certain values specific to 
Europe.145 The imperial civilizing mission laid the basis for justifying 
European trusteeship, guardianship, and protection of non-Europeans 
on the basis that differences needed a formal framework to be aligned 
with the ideal of European experience. 
Consequently, Tocqueville, writing on genocidal expeditions ac­
companied by expropriation of land undertaken by the French against 
Muslim Algerians, saw it necessary to bring "prosperity based on 
peace, regardless of how that peace is obtained."146 The colonizing 
European countries regarded themselves as only having duties of re­
specting the independence and nationality of other "civilized" na­
tions.147 These duties did not extend towards those to whom national­
ity and independence were evil or questionable goods.148 
The account of nationalism and its coincidence with imperialism is 
vividly illustrated in the scramble for Africa, a competitive episode of 
European imperialism to apportion Africa into spheres of influence 
between themselves. The loyalty and patriotism that nationalism 
evoked in this competitive episode demonstrates how the liberal aspi­
rations upon which the civilizing mission was purportedly grounded 
were vitiated by its arrogance and preoccupations with racial and 
other forms of Western/European superiority.149 The veneration of 
national culture and pride were thus the altar at which colonialism was 
executed. 
143. See, e.g., KEDOURIE, supra note 140; HANS KOHN, NATIONALISM: ITS MEANING 
AND HISTORY 9-11 (1975). By contrast, Edward Said cites Eric Hobsbawm as observing that 
Palestinian nationalism was created by "the common experience of Zionism settlement and 
conquest." See Edward Said, Nationalism, Human Rights and Interpretation, in FREEDOM 
AND INTERPRETATION: THE OXFORD AMNESTY 192 (Barbara Johnson ed., 1993). 
144. See Gyan Prakash, Introduction, in AFrER COLONIALISM: IMPERIAL HISTORIES 
AND POSTCOLONIAL DISPLACEMENTS 3 (Gyan Prakash ed., 1995); SAID, supra note 6, at 
40-49. 
145. See Annelise Riles, Note, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and 
the Essentialization of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723 (1993). 
146. Melvin Ritcher, Tocqueville on Algeria, 25 REV. POL. 362, 384-85 (1963) (citation 
omitted). 
147. See GROVOGUI, supra note 59, at 120-22. 
148. See 3 JOHN S. MILL, DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 167-68 (1865). 
149. See KEDOURIE, supra note 140, at 83. 
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This account departs from regardiµg nationalism solely as a prod­
uct of a European experience and instead focuses on its location at the 
intersection with the height of the discourse of national identity in 
Europe and colonialism. Hence, the encounter between Europe and 
the colonial world reveals the cultural connotations embedded in par­
ticular interpretations of nationalism. Nationalism also plays a role in 
erasing from the national memory the plunder and pain of imperial 
rule. For example, in the U.S. and in former colonial powers, nation­
alism erases the imperial past and repaints it in the golden color, de­
cor, and splendor of the political doctrine of popular sovereignty, 
equal opportunity, and self-governance - the leader of the free 
world.150 
Roth's separation of state and nation in his debate on legitimacy 
and illegitimacy of governments underestimates the significance of na­
tionalism in postcolonial societies. For example, African states were 
arbitrarily parceled out among colonizing European powers in the 
nineteenth century without regard to the reality on the ground. Con­
sequently, a nation of Somali peoples ended up in two juridical states, 
Kenya and Somalia. Similarly, the Maasai nations were split between 
Tanzania and Kenya.151 This arbitrary parcelization of Africa resulted 
in the imposition of artificial states resulting in what Makau Wa 
Mutua has called a "crisis of internal legitimacy": 
I contend that foreign imposition of artificial states and their continued 
entrapment within the concepts of statehood and sovereignty are sure to 
occasion the extinction of Africa unless those sacred cows are set aside 
for now to disassemble African states and reconfigure them. I propose 
that pre-colonial entities within the post-colonial order be allowed to ex­
ercise their right to self-determination. Only this radical but necessary 
step can legitimize the African state and avoid its demise.152 
Mutua's point is not merely the literal redrawing of the African map, 
but rather that attention must be paid "to African political and cul­
tural heritage if [the state] is to attain any legitimacy with broad sec­
tors of the people."153 Hence, the legitimacy of the state in Africa ac­
cording to Mutua is precarious, since its imposition has no roots 
among the African people. Some of the elements that constitute this 
kind of roots include reconsidering the relationship between the indi­
vidual and the state, and redefining the relationship of the state with 
international capital in a way that captures the integrity of the African 
150. See Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457 
{1997). 
151. See Makau Wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal In­
quiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'LL. 1118, 1119 {1995). 
152 Id. (footnote omitted). 
153. Id. at 1118, n.12. 
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state.154 These conceptions of legitimate statehood go beyond the ju­
ridical statehood that characterizes so many states in Africa today, 
since they are contextualized within actual circumstances. 
Why is juridical statehood so removed from context in Africa? Is 
it because this conception is Eurocentric in its origins? Abstract in its 
character? Imposed by colonial rule? These are all questions begging 
for an answer, and the extent to which Governmental Illegitimacy skips 
these questions is telling, especially because there has for some time 
now been a burgeoning literature in international law and relations on 
these very questions.155 
So far, I have made the claim that Roth's failure to consider the 
question of the nation, and therefore nationalism as well, confines le­
gitimacy to very narrow questions of legality divorced from existing 
reality. I have also argued that, at the height of nationalist moment in 
Europe, European imperialism in non-Western societies was also at its 
height. In essence, although some see a discontinuous history between 
European and non-European colonialism,156 there are striking conti­
nuities between them, especially with reference to the place of the na­
tion.157 
154. See id. at 1175-76. 
155. See id.; see also GROVOGUI, supra note 59; JACKSON, supra note 121; U.O. 
UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLONIALISM IN AFRICA (1979); Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na'im, The National Question, Secession and Constitutionalism: The Mediation 
of Competing Claims to Self-Determination, in STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: AN 
AFRICAN DEBATE ON DEMOCRACY 101 (Issa Shivji ed., 1991); Jeffrey Herbst, Challenges to 
Africa's Boundaries in the New World Order, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 17 (1992); Robert H. Jackson, 
Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 J. INT'L A.FF. 1 (1992); J. Klabbers & R. 
Lefeber, Africa: Lost Between Self Determination and Uti-Possidetis, in PEOPLES AND 
MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (C. Brolmann et al. eds., 1993); u.o. Umozurike, 
International Law and Colonialism in Africa, 3 EASTERN AFRICA L. REV. 47 (1970). 
156. Kedourie argues that nationalism is a new-fangled and unfamiliar idea for the peo­
ple of Asia and Africa. In his view, nationalism was for Europe and it could not be bor­
rowed. In essence, he argued that it was inefficient for leaders in these countries to appeal 
to nationalism, and he reco=ended that they should instead appeal to traditional idioms 
and customary associations that would evoke spontaneous "emotions of solidarity and group 
loyalty" in a pavlovian mode. KEDOURIE, supra note 140, at 66. In Kedourie's view, the 
new theory of nationalism in the third world constitutes "resentment and impatience of the 
rich, and virtue of the poor, the guilt of Europe and the innocence of Asia and Africa, salva­
tion through violence . . .  the long reign, universal love-served by masses-opium very potent­
excites belief into a frenzy of destruction." Id. Hans Kohn, in A HISTORY OF NATIONALISM 
IN THE EAST (1929), similarly dichotomizes Western- and Eastern-European nationalism. 
He considers the former indigenous and liberal while he opines the latter as non-Western, 
artificial, aggressive, and authoritarian. Id. at 3-4. Another perspective holds that third­
world nationalism does not even exist, since "agrarian civilisations do not engender nation­
alism, but industrial and industrial [sic] societies do." ERNEST GELLNER, CULTURE, 
IDENTITY, AND POLIDCS 18 (1987). 
157. See, e.g., Homi Bhabha, Introduction to NATION AND NARRATION (Homi Bhabha 
ed., 1990). Bhabha notes that there is no single model of nationalism that could prove ade­
quate to its myriad and contradictory forms. Nationalisms do not work the same every­
where. Hence, observes Bhabha, although the nation functions globally as an irreducible 
component of identity, the problem remains that no single term is capable of registering the 
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The nation is clearly central to understanding statehood today. 
One of the most distinguished historians of Africa, Basil Davidson, 
has written extensively on the various ways that arbitrary governance 
of artificial states in Africa brought about oppression, civil war, tor­
ture, and mass starvation.158 These consequences are in part explicable 
by considering "the Janus-face of nationalism, at once an engine of so­
cial reform and goad to political accountability, yet also a tool of 
middle-class warfare against labour . . .  [where] the imaginative 
invention of nations tends to outrun the political creation of states."159 
Although nationalism in Africa was in large part driven by strug­
gles for social justice and political independence, national unity pre­
ceded respect for competing claims of nationality within the post­
colonial state. The nationalist leadership argued that national unity 
was too important to be sacrificed in the name of ethnic loyalty and 
that time was too short for development to be distracted by the possi­
ble divisiveness of ethnic rivalry that had characterized colonial gov­
emance.160 Consequently, attempts to gain self-determination, such as 
Biafra in Nigeria and Katanga in the former Zaire, were roundly sup­
pressed.161 
multiple, incommensurable differences dividing one nation from one another (or from it­
self). There is no normal way to define a nation. 
158. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF 
THE NATION STATE (1992). 
159. John Lonsdale, States and Nations, 34 J. AFR. HIST. 143, 144 (1993) (book review); 
see also M.P.K. SORRENSON, LAND REFORM IN KIKUYU COUNTRY (1967); see also DAVID 
'THROUP, ECONOMIC & SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MAU MAU 1945-53 (1987); John Lonsdale, 
States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey, 24 AFR. STUD. REV. 139 
(1981). 
160. See Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil 
Politics in the New States, in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR 
MODERNITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA 105 (Clifford Geertz ed., 1963). Geertz notes that 
India's experience raises the question whether a new nation can survive "concession[s] to 
'narrow loyalties, petty jealousies and ignorant prejudices?' " Id. at 106 (citations omitted). 
Geertz observes that new states have a pre-political matrix of a rudimentary form as evi­
denced in its constitution by institutions, beliefs and solidarities. These and other perspec­
tives are critically appraised in MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITizEN AND SUBJECT: CON­
TEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (Sherry B. Ortner et al. 
eds., 1996). 
161. Katanga (then Shaba), a province of the former Zaire, today the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, sought to secede from Congo in 1978 to 1979 with assistance from 
exiles and rebels from the area. International assistance quelled the rebellion as President 
Mubutu's military was unable to respond. The Katanga secessionist attempt indicated the 
artificiality of the Zairean state and the complicity of the West in supporting a dictator that 
did not even have the command of his military. See Ghislain C. Kabwit, Zaire: The Roots of 
the Continuing Crisis, 17 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 381-407 (1979); see also Kenneth Adelman, 
Zaire's Year of Crisis, 77 AFR. AFF. 306 (1978). The Biafra secession attempt came after 
four of Nigeria's regional governments at the time failed to resolve their artificial co­
existence 'vithin one country, on the one hand, and the military leadership of the North over 
the rest of the country, on the other. This situation had led to successive electoral boycotts, 
ethnic cleansing of the Ibo community, and failure to agree on a return to civilian rule in 
Nigeria. In May of 1967, the Eastern Region declared itself a sovereign and independent 
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Under this reading of nationalism, Kenya's freedom struggle, the 
Mau Mau War of Independence, can be seen as a nationalist move­
ment for social justice and political freedom whose origins are trace­
able to British expropriation of land and repression of dissent.162 This 
view displaces earlier readings of the Mau Mau that considered it an 
atavistic deviation and imitation of the standard European experience. 
In reading the Mau Mau as a revolt or rebellion, Eurocentric readings 
also advanced the preposterous proposition that it was a savage re­
sponse to the alienation of benign colonial modernization.163 
Indeed, any reading of statehood that excludes the nation and na­
tionalism falls into the danger of characterizing non-European nation­
alism as a dangerous hypnotic obsession that differs from the intellect 
and reason that characterizes European nationalism. Nathaniel 
Berman's study of European nationalism in the interwar period chal­
lenges such a discontinuity. As in Africa, race, culture, place of origin, 
and linguistic groups all play a role in European nationalism. Non­
European nationalism cannot be regarded as a pathological deviation 
from a standard secularized European nationalism. Rather, as 
Berman shows, cultural heterogeneity and nationalist passion were 
significant backdrops against which international legal jurists in 
Europe proliferated doctrinal and institutional mechanisms such as 
plebiscites and minority protection systems within multinational 
European societies.164 Consequently, in showing how international 
law responded to the challenges of nationality and culture, Berman is 
able to illustrate how international law plays a culturally constitutive 
role. 
In contrast to other international legal scholars, like Makau in the 
African context and Berman in the European context, Roth under­
states the culturally constitutive character of international law. In his 
republic. The federal government declared a state emergency and divided Nigeria into 
twelve states. The federal government eventually defeated the secessionist attempt in 1970. 
162 See CARL G. ROSBERG & JOHN NOITINGHAM, THE MYTH OF THE MAU MAU: 
NATIONALISM IN KENYA {1966). 
163. See F.D. CORFIELD, HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND THE GROWTH OF THE MAU MAU 
1030 {1960). 
164. See Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruc­
tion, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 363 {1992). Berman has also examined the relationship be­
tween intra-European and colonial aspects of international legal history in the context of 
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, and Morocco. See, e.g., Nathaniel Berman, The International Law 
of Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal History, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC 
CONFLICT 25 (David Wippman ed., 1994); Nathaniel Berman, Aftershocks: Exoticization, 
Normalization, and the Hermeneutic Compulsion, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 281; Nathaniel 
Berman, Between "Alliance" and "Localization": Nationalism and the New Oscillationism, 
26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 449 {1994); Nathaniel Berman, Beyond Colonialism and 
Nationalism? Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia and Peaceful Change, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L LAW 421 
(1996); Nathaniel Berman, Economic Consequences, Nationalist Passions: Keynes, Crisis, 
Culture and Policy, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 619 (1995); Nathaniel Berman, 
Nationalism "Good" and "Bad": Vicissitudes of an Obsession, 90 A.S.I.L. PROC. 214 (1996). 
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emphasis on the state as a juridical entity bereft of any cultural, ethnic, 
or other such affiliation, he ignores the origins of the idea of the state 
in Western history, its imposition in non-Western societies, and the 
violence that has accompanied its creation in the name of nationalism. 
That you could find nations anywhere across the world imposing a 
Eurocentric notion of the state upon these nations (as colonialism did) 
without regard to their nationalities would unsurprisingly result in na­
tion building enterprises that were at times successful but, more often 
than, not less than successful. In brief, the state as a legal entity is not 
a neutral or even universal ideal. For example, in enshrining the 
European form of the state as the basic unit of international relations, 
international law deploys a specifically European idea as a universal 
norm. International law is, in this broad sense, therefore constitutive 
to the extent that it privileges the European state as a natural and ba­
sic unit of international governance, and it is widely accepted as the 
inevitable unit around which nations organize their affairs. 
One latent danger in considering the state as a juridical concept is 
that international legal analysis then treats states that do not conform 
to an idealized European experience as trapped within the straitjacket 
of primordial attachments such as ethnicity. However, once the con­
cept of the nation is introduced into the analysis, it becomes clear how 
juridical statehood plays a constitutive role in manipulating ethnicity, 
now seen less as an essential subject but rather as a contingent and 
constructed artifact.165 
Apart from the African experience alluded to above, there is an­
other contemporary example of the danger of looking at the state as 
merely juridical: the former Yugoslavia. Elizabeth Woodward has 
persuasively argued that post-Cold War security measures based on 
the promotion of human rights, transparency, and other nonmilitary 
means of conflict resolution, such as the right of peoples to self­
determination, inviolability of international borders, and republican 
multiparty elections, became hallmarks of European policy in the 
former Yugoslavia.166 Consequently, "little regard was paid to the in­
consistency of the right of self-determination, on the one hand and the 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia's borders. Western powers sup­
ported anti-communist supporters in the republican elections not-
165. Nationalist leadership often invoked notions such as India as undivided subjects 
with a singular will. Critical appraisals include PARTIIA CHATIERJEE, NATIONALIST 
TuOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD: A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE? (1986). With regard 
to ethnicity, Leroy Vail notes that "[t]he creation of ethnicity as an ideological statement of 
popular appeal in the context of profound social, economic and political change in southern 
Africa was the result of the differential conjunction of various historical forces and phenom­
ena." Leroy Vail, Introduction, in THE CREATION OF TRIBALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 11 
(Leroy Vail ed., 1989). 
166. See WOODWARD, supra note 100. 
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withstanding their extremist nationalist sympathies."167 Woodward's 
analysis complements and challenges our understanding of the 
Yugoslavian wars of 1991-1994. She demonstrates how secessionist, 
anti-Communist, and xenophobic nationalist leaders exploited 
Western support as they purported to defend the cherished principles 
of self-determination, human rights, and individual liberty. In so 
doing, these politicians legitimized their war plans as necessary de­
fenses of these principles.168 In conclusion, then, one has to appreciate 
that these abstract but cherished principles are not necessarily eman­
cipatory;169 viewing them as antidotes to the violence of ethnicity and 
illiberal nationalism only downplays the tragic role they have at times 
been mobilized to serve. In addition, as Woodward argues, it would 
be foolhardy to ignore the role that the policies of IFis played in fan­
ning constitutional battles between the republics that eventually ended 
up in armed confrontation.170 In acknowledging the constitutive role 
that abstract legal concepts such as statehood, self-determination, and 
human rights could play against a rapidly changing economic and 
social background, it becomes easier to drop the presumption that in­
ternational law and norms act in the "interests of human rights, demo­
cracy and the people, while local institutions, actors or cultures are 
seen as posing a threat to these values."171 
VIII. OF DEMOCRACY, NEOLIBERALISM, AND RECOGNITION 
Roth also analyzes the case of Nicaragua in his statehood discus­
sion. He concludes that exploration with the view that the authoriza­
tion for foreign arms and logistical assistance to insurgents fighting the 
Samoza regime "indicates some broad-based movement toward recon­
sideration of the legal legitimacy that traditional doctrine has auto-
167. Id. at 148. 
168. See id. at 198. 
169. See Orford, supra note 99, at 444. 
170. In one of her bold assertions on this point, Woodward notes that: 
Economic reforms such as those demanded of Yugoslavia by foreign creditors and Western 
governments ask for political suicide: they require governments to reduce their own powers. 
They also do so at the same time that the demands on governments, particularly the neces­
sity to protect civil order and to provide stability in the midst of rapid change, are ever 
greater. Without a stable civil and legal order, the social conditions that are created can be 
explosive: large scale unemployment among young people and unskilled urban dwellers; 
demobilized soldiers and security police looking for private employment; thriving conditions 
for black market activities and crime; and flourishing local and global traffic in small arms 
and ammunition. 
WOODWARD, supra note 100, at 17. 
171. Orford, supra note 99; see also Michael N. Barnett, Bringing in the New World Or­
der: Liberalism, Legitimacy and the United Nations, 49 WORLD POL. 526, 545 (1997) (noting 
that "much of the Third World is viewed . • •  not as a source of support for a liberal interna­
tional order but rather as a potential site of resistance"). 
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matically conferred on governments in effective control" (p. 303). His 
point is that, just as cases of racist, colonial, or alien control are ille­
gitimate ab initio, so is a "ruling apparatus that is manifestly unrepre­
sentative of the underlying sovereign political community or that fla­
grantly violates certain irreducible duties upon which all legitimate 
governance is predicated" (p. 303). Roth is not, however, oblivious to 
the mixed motivations such interventions involve, as his references to 
the U.S.'s "neo-colonialist penetration" of Cambodia and Vietnam (p. 
289) and candid but uncritical assessment of the U.S.'s role in 
Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador indicate.172 He is therefore care­
ful to warn of unilateral use of force based on ass�ssments of foreign 
regimes, since such unilateral action constitutes a violation of the types 
of actions that the international order seeks to preclude. Roth's dis­
cussion of the Panamanian case therefore warns of the danger of uni­
lateral action and cites approval for a multilateral approach that would 
have greater acceptability. He also sees prospects of a consensus in fa­
vor of empirical manifestations of popular will with "the increased 
role of the international organizations and NGOs [Nongovernmental 
Organizations] in orchestrating and monitoring electoral solutions to 
civil conflict" (p. 320). This improved context for the empirical mani­
festations of popular will is the backdrop against which Roth discusses 
Haiti. 
His discussion of the debates surrounding six cases of credentials 
to the U.N. - Congo-Leopoldville, Yemen, Cambodia/Khmer 
Republic, Cambodia/Kampuchea, China, and Hungary - "do not 
yield straightforward answers to dilemmas in recognition doctrine" (p. 
283). In his view, the cases show no consistent presumption in favor of 
the established government or the willingness of a government to 
abide by international commitments as a baseline for recognition. The 
effective-control doctrine cannot, therefore, be mechanically applied 
since the recognition of governments turns out to be informed by a 
range of considerations - legal, political, practical, and moral. Would 
the increased empirical manifestations of popular will displace the un­
predictability of recognition or add to its toolkit of criteria to be taken 
into account? 
The answer here is clearly ambiguous. How, for example, should 
the will of the people, underlying authority of government guaranteed 
in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),173 be construed? Does it merely refer to a process of ascer­
taining voter preference as long as it guarantees competition and par­
ticipation, a la liberals, or should it be inferred from the ability of a 
172. Pp. 347-57. For a critical assessment, see Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A 
Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L LJ. 341 (1995). 
173. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 
(1948). 
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government to fulfill "an assigned social function," (such as achieve­
ment of effective control in the name of a program of social transfor­
mation), a la revolutionary-democratic dictatorships? Does the ab­
sence of reference to the will of the people as the basis of the authority 
of government in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)174 leave open the nature of the relationship 
between authority and elections and authority and participation (p. 
330)? Does the reference to democratic society in Article 21 of the 
UDHR mean more than just nonfascist? Why did Article 21 of the 
ICCPR not specify multi-party elections as a basis of establishing 
authority? Why was the term "democratic society" omitted in Article 
25 of the ICCPR (p. 332)? 
Roth provides the answer on the basis of the post-Cold War praxis 
and perhaps an emerging opinio juris: 
With the end of the Cold War period has come a shift in the patterns 
of international division regarding participatory rights. The most robust 
challenge to the liberal-democratic approach, the concept of 
revolutionary-democratic dictatorship that held sway in the Socialist and 
in much of the Non-Aligned bloc, has been crippled by the ignominious 
collapse of the Soviet and Eastern European regimes and the fading 
away of revolutionary nationalist regimes and movements in the Third 
World. Of the remaining regimes of revolutionary origin, some, like 
China and Vietnam, have reversed their programmatic course so thor­
oughly as to render invocations of revolutionary struggle implausi­
ble . . . .  
. . . There are thus many fewer general appeals in the international 
discourse to the liberal-authoritarian rationale that popular movements 
need be suppressed in order to maintain liberty, although the claim con­
tinues to be made in individual cases . . . . [pp. 333-34] 
Roth therefore concludes that, to the extent that there is no longer a 
universalist alternative to liberal democracy and that exceptions to it 
are made on the basis of cultural particularity, this perhaps explains 
why de facto control is insufficient to substantiate the claims of auto­
cratic leaders. Yet, as Roth concludes, the right to political participa­
tion is open to many interpretations. In addition, he says that elec­
tions in many parts of the world have been less than liberal or 
democratic, since they have coexisted with "de jure or de facto repres­
sion, exclusion of candidates regarded as unacceptable, and reserves of 
power for unelected (especially military) elites, not to mention 
mechanisms for the perpetration of fraud" (p. 337). Hence, while 
popular sovereignty may be used to deprive a regime of de facto rec­
ognition, it does not follow that popular sovereignty necessarily stems 
from a liberal democratic interpretation or that forcible or nonforcible 
174. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY 
Doc. No. 2 (1977), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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interventions should result in cases of noncompliance with this 
"democratic entitlement" (p. 339). This democratic entitlement is 
only one of several methods by which popular will may be assessed. It 
may well be assessed through time-honored traditions, demonstra­
tions, public opinion, and so on. Indeed, according to Roth: 
A dictatorial government, even though failing to provide adequate 
mechanisms to render it accountable, may nonetheless appear legitimate 
in the eyes of the majority of its subjects. Moreover, an elected govern­
ment may not . . . . [Consequently,] it cannot be said a priori that coups 
d'etat, emergency rule, or even substantial periods of one-party or coali­
tional dictatorship violate popular sovereignty. 
This is not to say that the principle of popular sovereignty cannot give 
rise to a legal judgment of governmental illegitimacy. It is merely to say 
that such a judgment cannot be predicated solely on the failure of a gov­
ernmental system to conform to a specified institutional form. [p. 344] 
Roth also acknowledges that there are instances where methods quali­
tatively superior to effective control are possible and necessary to 
measure legitimacy - such as where elections are used as part of the 
arbitration between antagonistic parties, where these parties consent 
to the elections. Here the elections are a superior predictor of popular 
will (p. 364). Roth therefore has a rich telling of a complex story. 
Having already concluded that the effective control doctrine cannot be 
mechanically applied to determine legitimacy of governments, his dis­
cussion of political-participation rights comes to a similar conclusion 
- empirical manifestations of popular will through processes such as 
elections are unpredictable indicators of popular will, just like effective 
control. 
International response to the Haitian coup of September, 1991 is, 
however, for Roth the momentous case indicating a clear demonstra­
tion that liberal internationalism may upstage effective control as a 
predictor of legitimacy or popular will. The swift international denial 
of legal recognition for the coup regime followed closely on the heels 
of the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the 
Inter-American system (pp. 374-77). Did this only indicate the in­
creased importance of participatory mechanisms in determining 
popular sovereignty in the Western hemisphere, or was it an ac­
cidental constellation of an unusual set of circumstances unlikely to be 
replicated? In Roth's view, "[g]iven the strength of traditions dis­
favoring direct international judgements on the legitimacy of internal 
processes of rule, and given the persistence of broadly-supported pro­
nouncements evoking those traditions, prudence dictates reading the 
Santiago, Moscow, and similar documents narrowly" (p. 376; footnote 
omitted). 
Roth subsequently discusses how the Security Council justified use 
of force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to restore Aristide, for 
purposes of assessing "states' collective perception of the legal limits 
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to action, not with the political determinants of actions taken within 
those perceived limits" (p. 383 n.57; emphasis added). The fact that 
Roth gives this disclaimer in a footnote is as revealing as it is striking. 
It is striking since he celebrates Haiti as the point at which the interna­
tional law of governmental legitimacy is born (p. 387), and it is re­
vealing for what it fails to examine. As Richard Falk has argued, the 
U.S.-led U.N. intervention to reinstall Aristide in Haiti continues a 
dilemma of international diplomatic interventionism - it simultane­
ously promises democracy promotion and protects the economic rights 
of investors and the traditional elite in these countries in ways inimical 
to socia� and economic progress.175 Hence, Aristide's return to power 
was conditional upon his abandonment of his populist program of re­
distributing disproportionate concentrations of property and ill-gotten 
wealth from the propertied classes to the poor majority. He had to 
commit himself to the stringent programs of economic restructuring of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that favored returns to in­
vestment in terms of growth and profitability at the expense of social 
spending.176 The amnesty given to the allies of the dictatorship of 
General Cedras also raises troubling issues for a political agenda that 
simply buried problems in the quicksand of economic dislocation and 
political repression. As Falk remarks: 
What kind of restoration of democracy is taking place if the program and 
orientation of the elected leader is being scrapped as a condition for the 
support of his return? And is not the new approach to development en­
dorsed by Aristide tantamount to an acceptance of the right-wing pro­
gram favored by the military? What is worse, if Haiti goes along this 
path, there is no short-term assurance that the acute poverty plaguing 
ninety-five percent of Haitians will be relieved, or that the overall condi­
tion of the society will be improved.177 
Hence, just when Roth celebrates Haiti as the exemplary contempo­
rary case of successful prodemocracy intervention, we realize just how 
hollow this success story is for poverty-stricken Haitians. Their trag­
edy was compounded by the U.S. authorities who violated interna­
tional norms of non-refoulement by refusing to give Haitians fleeing 
the atrocities of the military regime refugee status in the U.S.178 Tem­
porary relief against return to Haiti was won in U.S. courts, but the 
175. See Falk, supra note 172, at 348. 
176. See id. at 347. For another critical and important assessment, see ROBINSON, supra 
note 55, at 305-16, 333-39. 
177. Falk, supra note 172, at 353. According to Robinson, the political intervention in 
Haiti "included multiple overlaps between the penetration of transnational capital, the • •  , 
class structures and the emergence of new political protagonists, external constraints which 
the global economy placed on internal policy options and socioeconomic transforma­
tions . . . .  " ROBINSON, supra note 55, at 335. 
178. See Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in the United States Human Rights 
Policy, 103 YALE LJ. 2391 (1994). 
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U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the refugees.179 As the current un­
dersecretary for Human Rights argued, the courts implicitly endorsed 
the anti-immigrant sentiment in the country whose image of the "ar­
chetypal 'good' alien . . .  is a white, European, healthy, heterosexual, 
self-sufficient refugee, arriving alone in search of political asylum . . . .  
[I]t hardly surprises that black, poor Caribbean migrants arriving in 
large numbers, many afflicted with HIV . . .  should fare badly in our 
courts."180 The increasingly hostile post-Cold War attitude towards 
refugees, especially those from non-Western countries, has been ac­
companied by a discourse of in-country protection and internally dis­
placed persons at the expense of the post-Second World War refugee 
framework that protected refugees against involuntary return to their 
persecutors. 
Last but not least, the Supreme Court rejected the Haitian refu­
gees' attempt to enforce their rights against non-refoulement at federal 
and international law, mainly on the basis that the U.S. could not en­
force this right extraterritorially (the refugees were not considered to 
be in the United States, as most were quarantined in the infamous 
U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba).181 Paradoxically, the Supreme 
Court within the same period "permitted extraterritorial application 
of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct that produces a substantial an­
ticompetitive effect in the United States."182 The different outcomes in 
these cases indicate an underlying public/private split - the U.S. 
could unproblematically extend the territorial reach of its commercial 
legislation overseas, but it would be slow to extend domestic human­
rights protection to migrants from a poor third-world country. I have 
already argued that a public/private scheme, such as the one that un­
derlies the Supreme Court's decisions here, is fallacious. It presup­
poses that private law rules are neutral, while cases of collective non­
recognition of governments and interventions in civil society, such as 
applying U.S. law to a foreign country, are necessarily political and 
should be minimized. However, as my commentary on the Haitian in­
tervention illustrates, the international economic programs imposed 
by the U.S.-dominated IMF should not be confused with the rhetoric 
of "a clash between a liberating foreign force and a corrupt local rul­
ing class" since it really was "the sealing of a long-term pact between 
that foreign force and the Haitian elite."183 To construe these eco­
nomic programs in the discourse of neutrality is to clothe alliances of 
domination and exploitation with a veil of legitimacy. 
179. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
180. Koh, supra note 178, at 2422. 
181. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 188-207 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
182 Id. at2418 (emphasis removed). 
183. ROBINSON, supra note 55, at 307. 
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CONCLUSION: DECENTERING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
ILLEGITIMACY OF GOVERNMENTS 
This Review has argued in favor of decentering the international 
law of governmental legitimacy away from: its Eurocentric binary be­
tween liberalism and conservatism; its formalism in separating law 
from politics and therefore in construing the state as a juridical entity 
separate from the nation; its binary opposition between public and 
private interventions; and its decontextualization from the centrality 
of the history of colonialism in international law and from the regres­
sive programs of economic reform known as neoliberalism. Having 
made these critiques in a variety of contexts, I conclude that Roth 
overstates the law of illegitimacy or legitimacy of governments in in­
ternational law exclusively as a set of rules or policy options without 
considering it as one component in a toolkit of political strategies and 
ideas that get deployed every day. His study would have been much 
richer and more legitimate had it engaged in a critical enterprise that 
did not shy away from colonialism and neoliberalism. It would have 
broadened our understanding of the legitimacy not only of govern­
ments, but also of the private order over which international law lies, 
of international institutions and their programs, and of the nature of 
the interaction these institutions have with third-world countries and 
their elites. 
One of the striking omissions from the book is the manner in 
which governments that fail to conform to the nonnegotiable pro­
grams of neoliberal economic restructuring lose their entitlements to 
IMF and World Bank programs and lending, even if they would oth­
erwise be entitled to them. There is, in fact, perhaps no better exam­
ple of how states lose their legal entitlements, and thus their legiti­
macy, at the international level than through the relationships they 
have with international capital. That Roth fails to connect the eco­
nomic programs now being pursued around the world with the hu­
manitarian impulse behind humanitarian interventionism is therefore 
significant. His rationalization, to the effect that his project is not po­
litical but legal, dismally fails to explain this omission. 
I contend that, if debates on legitimacy in international law were 
decentered from their statistism and Eurocentricity, and contextual­
ized in the rich and complex interactions of colonialism, neoliberalism 
and non-European ways of thinking about legitimacy, a richer dis­
course of legitimacy would be possible. Such a strategy would involve 
a new politics that would not be tied to the legalism underlying Roth's 
project or his thesis of a clash between universalism and cultural par­
ticularity as the alignment of post-Cold War world conflict. This new 
politics would instead displace and decenter the search for legitimacy 
in monolithic, homogenous, and universal categories in favor of in­
creasing our attention to the legitimacy of international institutions 
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and laws and alliances between local and global politics and economic 
programs as may be evidenced in colonialism or neoliberalism. In ad­
dition, non-Western sources of legitimacy inspired by the ethical and 
political virtue of these societies in their heterogeneity would greatly 
enrich the discourse on legitimacy. Indeed, as Roth's analysis sug­
gests, even legitimacy in the West cannot be located in any single pa­
rameter. There is therefore no better way to democratize national and 
international society than to multiply the sites at which we look for le­
gitimacy (private, public, national, international, etc.) and sources of 
its underlying meaning in the rich diversity of international society. A 
discourse on legitimacy irrelevant to the non-European world will be 
as hollow as the promises of an international law unable to examine its 
alliance with projects such as colonialism and programs such as neo­
liberalism. 
Hence, insofar as neoliberalism delegitimizes social provisioning 
for public health and education programs by stigmatizing public policy 
as inefficient and susceptible to corrupt and authoritarian governance, 
there is need for an optic in the international legal discourse on legiti­
macy through which such an outcome can be expressed. For example, 
one could argue that such delegitimation is suspect since its justifica­
tions have often proved false, if not tragic, in many a developing coun­
try. Hence, reducing governmental interventions in the economy has 
not automatically led to increase in economic growth and personal 
freedom in many of these countries. The argument that governmental 
interventions in the economy, including those intended to redress so­
cial division, hierarchy, and inequality in society, are inefficient or 
profit-constraining becomes an apology for the redistribution of na­
tional income in favor of profit or capital by the removal of such 
profit-constraining regulations, including those that support welfare 
needs. The neoliberal argument that the pain of economic restruc­
turing is a necessary cost that a society must bear in order to produce a 
higher rate of investment, productivity, growth, and profit must hence 
factor into any discourse of legitimacy with democracy as its goal. 
Neoliberalism is an invitation of nineteenth-century classical legal 
thought with its attendant disposition against moral and political rea­
soning. It is committed to the necessity of a decentralized market 
economy and political system that could increase wealth while main­
taining freedom and avoiding the tyranny of postcolonial authoritari­
anism. In view of this brooding neoliberal omnipresence, the impera­
tive to democratize the discourse on legitimacy remains critical and 
urgent. 
